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COMPARING A REFORMED ESTATE TAX





HE administration of George W. Bush in 2001 came close to
achieving complete and permanent repeal of the federal estate and
generation-skipping taxes, if not the gift tax (which remains to
back up the income tax).' Those opposing repeal have fallen back to the
position of conceding the shortcomings of the federal transfer taxes and
of proposing that they be "reformed," mainly by increasing the per tax-
payer lifetime estate and gift tax exemption to a very large number some-
where in the $2-10 million range.2 Alternatives to a reformed estate and
gift tax system are a federal inheritance tax, an accessions tax, or a repeal
of the income tax rule that excludes gratuitous receipts from gross in-
come.3 A principle purpose of this article is to put these alternatives on
the table and to compare them to each other and to a reformed estate
and gift tax system.
In the world of academia, there are various factions among those that
* Stearns, Weaver, Miller, Weissler, Alhadeff & Sitterson Professor of Law, Florida
State University College of Law; LL.M., New York University, 1973; LL.B., Harvard Uni-
versity, 1967; B.A., Harvard University, 1963.
1. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. Law No. 107-
16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001) [hereinafter The 2001 Act]. A description of the federal wealth
transfer taxes (the estate, gift, and generation-skipping taxes) immediately prior to The
2001 Act is found in STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX'N, 107TH CONG., DESCRIPTION AND
ANALYSIS OF PRESENT LAW AND PROPOSALS RELATING TO FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFr
TAXATION (Mar. 14, 2001) [hereinafter JCT DESCRIPTION]. Under The 2001 Act, the es-
tate and generation-skipping taxes are scheduled to expire at the end of 2009, but the
repeal itself expires at the end of 2010, causing these taxes to reappear in their 2001 form.
The 2001 Act, supra § 901.
2. Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Straight Talk about the "Death" Tax: Politics, Economics, and
Morality, 89 TAX NOTES 1159, 1168-69 (2000) (noting Democratic bills to raise the exemp-
tion level to $2 million and $4 million); H.R. 5008, 107th Cong. § 2(a)(1) (2002) ($3.5 mil-
lion exemption); S. 179, 107th Cong. (2001) ($4 million exemption per married couple plus
family-owned business interest deduction capped at $9,375,000); H.R. 543, 107th Cong.
(2001) (lifetime exemption of $10 million, annual gift exclusion of $50,000, and maximum
rate of 30%).
3. I.R.C. §§ 101(a) (life insurance proceeds), 102(a) (other gratuitous receipts), and
1014 (excluding pre-death appreciation from any income tax) (2002).
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support some kind of tax on gratuitous transfers. 4 One camp (which in-
cludes this author) has advocated that wealth transfers received be in-
cluded in the income tax base of the recipient, without deduction by the
transferor.5 Another camp favors the current gross income exclusion and
supports the federal transfer taxes (if at all) from the external-to-tax per-
spective of being a mechanism to curb undue concentrations of wealth. 6
The second camp hasn't really engaged the first camp on the merits, ex-
cept by invoking the specter of double-taxing the same thing, once to the
transferor and again to the transferee. 7 The first camp replies that such
double taxation is not per se illegitimate, because the transferor and the
4. There is a camp that favors repeal of the existing transfer taxes, but at least some
members of this camp may favor some alternative. Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case
for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L.J. 283 (1994) [hereinafter Uneasy Case]; Joel C.
Dobris, A Brief for the Abolition of All Transfer Taxes, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1215 (1984);
Charles 0. Galvin, To Bury The Estate Tax Not To Praise It, 52 TAX NOTES 1413 (1991)
(preferring income-inclusion system).
5. HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME
AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 57-58 (1938); 3 ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION,
REPORT 477-507 (1966) (Canada); Joseph M. Dodge, Beyond Estate and Gift Tax Reform:
Including Gifts and Bequests in Income, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1177 (1978) [hereinafter Income
Inclusion]; Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Constitutional Meaning of Income and the Income
Taxation of Gifts, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1992); Charles 0. Galvin, Taxing Gains At Death: A
Further Comment, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1525, 1528-29 (1993); John K. McNulty, A Transfer
Tax Alternative: Inclusion under the Income Tax, 4 TAX NOTES 24 (1976). Under current
law, gratuitous accessions are excluded from gross income under I.R.C. § 102(a).
6. James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825 (2001);
James R. Repetti, The Case for the Estate and Gift Tax, 86 TAX NOTES 1493 (2000); Jay A.
Soled & Charles Davenport, Cremating Transfer Taxes: Is There Hope for a Resurrection?,
34 WAKE FORESTI L. REV. 229 (1999); David H. Brockway, Comprehensive Estate and Gift
Tax Reform, 67 TAX NOTES 1089 (1995); Gerald R. Jantscher, The Aims of Death Taxation,
in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 40, 51 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977). A
more modest version of the same justification is that the transfer taxes enhance the
progressivity of the income tax. Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not To Bury
It, 93 YALE L.J. 259, 271-73 (1983). The easy rejoinder is that there is much that could be
done to the income tax to achieve the same end more directly and effectively, such as
removing the permanent exemption for unrealized gains at death. Joseph M. Dodge, A
Deemed Realization Approach Is Superior To Carryover Basis (And Avoids Most of the
Problems of the Estate and Gift Tax), 54 TAX L. REV. 421 (2001) [hereinafter Deemed
Realization]; Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing Gains at Death, 46 VAND. L. REV. 361 (1993).
7. One-sentence or summary dismissals of the income inclusion approach are found
in DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 157-60 (1986); RICHARD GOODE,
THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 99-100 (1976); Michael Graetz, Expenditure Tax Design, in
WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED: INCOME OR EXPENDITURE? 161, 200 (Joseph A. Pechman ed.,
1980); Alvin Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE
L.J. 1081, 1083-93 (1980). An attempt to sort out the issues is made in Joseph M. Dodge,
Gratuitous Transfers Under a Consumption Tax, 51 TAX L. REV. 529 (1996) [hereinafter
Consumption Tax], a parodied version of which is critiqued in Karen C. Burke & Grayson
M.P. McCouch, A Consumption Tax on Gifts and Bequests?, 17 VA. TAX REV. 657 (1998).
The main thesis of the latter piece appears to be that an estate tax or accessions tax is
"more flexible" than an income-inclusion system, id. at 705, but it is not clear what inter-
ests are to be served by such flexibility other than exemption of the upper middle class.
What represents "flexibility" to one is a "loophole" to another. In any event, there is no
reason why an income-inclusion approach cannot be "tweaked" with such special features
as annual or lifetime exemptions, deferral provisions (using a zero-basis mechanism), spe-
cial rate structures, and so on.
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transferee are separate taxpayers, each with an independent tax base. 8 A
justification is needed for why "partial" double taxation under a wealth
transfer tax is good (or at least tolerable) but comprehensive double taxa-
tion under an income tax is bad. 9 Indeed, several academics opposed to
the income-inclusion approach seem attracted to a system that, in many
respects, resembles an income-inclusion approach, namely, the accessions
tax. 10 The accessions tax, like the income-inclusion approach, would tax
the transferees. Under the accessions tax, gratuitous receipts would be
added to the cumulative lifetime accessions tax base of the transferee, but
lifetime accessions up to a fixed dollar amount would be exempt.1 The
income-inclusion approach, however, would simply treat gratuitous re-
ceipts as income includable in the annual income tax base, with no fixed-
dollar annual or lifetime exclusions.
The theoretical merits of taxing vs. not taxing wealth transfers will not
be taken up in this contribution,' 2 which instead focuses on how alterna-
tive tax systems relating to gratuitous transfers would be structured in
order to implement their basic premises. Part I argues that any trans-
feree-oriented tax should possess greater appeal than a transferor-ori-
ented tax with respect to achieving such goals as curbing undue
accumulations of wealth or improving equality of opportunity. Part I also
compares estate and gift taxes, inheritance taxes, accessions taxes, and
income-inclusion systems with respect to their appropriate respective rate
and exemption structures. Part II lays out the basic structural features
(and design choices) that would inhere in any of these systems insofar as
they stay true to their underlying premises. A fundamental thesis is that it
should not be simply taken for granted that features of the existing federal
8. Both the notion of ability-to-pay and the Schanz-Haig-Simons concept of income
look to each individual taxpayer's material resources during the taxable period relative to
other taxpayers. Wealth gratuitously transferred to a private individual represents the ex-
ercise of economic power by the donor for personal use that cannot support a deduction,
and it represents an increase in the material resources of the transferee.
9. Possible efficiency-type justifications for opposing the inclusion of gratuitous re-
ceipts in the income or consumption tax base are advanced, and rebutted, in Consumption
Tax, supra note 7, at 573-88. See also Louis Kaplow, A Note on Subsidizing Gifts, 58 J.
PUB. ECON. 469 (1995) (favoring policies that encourage inter vivos gifts, especially to
charity, on theory that gifts enhance the welfare of both donor and donee, but not really
addressing bequests or issues of tax system design).
10. Michael Boskin, An Economist's Perspective on Estate Taxation, in DEATH, TAXES
ANn FAMILY PROPERTY 56, 66 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977); Eric Rakowski, Can
Wealth Taxes Be Justified?, 53 TAX L. REV. 263, 337-47 [hereinafter Wealth Taxes] (appear-
ing to favor a consumption tax modified to take into account the holding period of acces-
sions); Burke & McCouch, supra note 7, at 701-04.
11. Edward C. Halbach, Jr., An Accessions Tax, 23 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 211,
229-35 (1988); William D. Andrews, The Accessions Tax Proposal, 22 TAX L. REV. 589(1967) (describing the 1968 ALl accessions tax proposal included as part of the ALl Fed-
eral Estate and Gift Tax Project); Harry A. Rudick, A Proposal for an Accessions Tax, 1
TAX L. REV. 25 (1945).
12. A recent survey of the economic issues posed by wealth transfer taxes is DOES
ATLAS SHRUG?: THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH (Joel B. Slemrod
ed., 2000). For the view that these issues cannot be solved solely on the basis of distribu-
tive-justice theory, see Daniel N. Shaviro, Commentary: Inequality, Wealth, and Endow-
ment, 53 TAX L. REV. 397, 420 (2000).
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transfer taxes should be carried over to any of the transferee-oriented
systems.
Among the conclusions reached herein are: (1) the estate tax is the
worst transfer tax except from the angle of neutrality with respect to be-
quests; (2) the justification for an accessions tax is somewhat shaky; (3)
the accessions tax and income-inclusion approaches are sufficiently close
as to suggest the possibility of a hybrid system that would combine the
most appealing features of each; (4) generation-skipping transfers do not
warrant a special tax; (5) an unlimited marital exclusion is contrary to the
purpose of an accessions tax; (6) an accessions tax and an income-inclu-
sion tax offer considerable simplification advantages over an estate tax or
an inheritance tax; and (7) an income-inclusion system is doctrinally the
simplest.
I. THE INADEQUACY OF THE ESTATE TAX
This Part argues the hardly-startling proposition that the current trans-
feror-oriented system is the hardest kind of tax on gratuitous transfers to
defend from the angle of political rhetoric and policy. This Part also sug-
gests the contours of rate and exemption structures under the various
modes of taxing gratuitous transfers or receipts.
A. ALTERNATIVE WAYS OF TAXING GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS
The core operating concept of the existing federal transfer taxes is that
the cumulative (lifetime and deathtime) gratuitous transfers of an individ-
ual constitute a cumulative tax base that is subject to progressive rates.13
The centerpiece of current federal transfer taxes is the estate tax. Both
the gift tax and the generation-skipping tax (GST) are back-ups to the
estate tax,' 4 and the bulk of revenues from the transfer taxes are pro-
duced by the estate tax.15 The estate tax (re-labeled the "death tax") is
the target of the repeal rhetoric. 16
The estate tax concept can be contrasted with three competing trans-
feree-oriented modes of wealth transfer taxation. One (and the oldest) is
the inheritance tax concept, where exemptions and (where applicable)
progressive rate schedules apply on a per-legatee basis, and rate sched-
ules typically increase as the degree of relationship to the decedent di-
minishes. The second and third modes are the accessions tax and the
13. See 1.R.C. § 2001(b), (c) (2002) (tax base is lifetime post-1976 taxable gifts plus the
taxable estate). The taxable estate is the gross estate less deductions.
14. The gift tax is also viewed as a back up to the income tax, by imposing a toll charge
on income-assignment strategies. See Jonathan G. Blattmachr & Mitchell M. Gans, Wealth
Transfer Tax Repeal: Some Thoughts on Policy and Planning, 2001 TAX NorEs TODAY 10-
110 (2001). The gift tax was not repealed by The 2001 Act, supra note 1.
15. Estimated net gift tax collections in 2001 were $3.9 billion, and estimated estate tax
collections were $24.4 billion. See Summary of Internal Revenue Collections, by Type of
Tax, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001, Internal Revenue Service, at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soi/01db01co.xls (last visited Nov. 21, 2002).
16. See authorities cited supra note t.
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income-inclusion system, already alluded to. On its face, any of the trans-
feree-oriented alternatives to the current federal transfer taxes would be
better suited to curb undue accumulations of wealth than the estate tax.17
B. Is A TAX ON GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS NECESSARY To CURB
UNDUE ACCUMULATIONS OF WEALTH?
If the problem is stated to be "undue concentrations of wealth," one
can argue that a transfer tax is superfluous. Thus, "concentration" of
wealth in a single individual by inheritance, given the abolition of primo-
geniture in the United States, is "naturally" unlikely since wealth tends to
be divided among members of an ever-expanding family. 18 The principal
of trusts often is eroded relative to inflation, 19 and large trusts are likely
to have multiple current beneficiaries and remainders. Moreover, those
who receive substantial legacies outright have little incentive to engage in
gainful employment and may regress to the mean. There is evidence that
inherited wealth tends towards dissipation rather than increased concen-
tration and that most very wealthy individuals (other than surviving
spouses of wealthy individuals) are not the beneficiaries of large
inheritances.20
To the extent that these forces operate, it can be argued that the trans-
fer taxes may be largely irrelevant in terms of curbing undue concentra-
tions of wealth.21 Nature will take its course. A handful of dynasties
might sustain themselves over time, but that might not be sufficient to
justify a wholly separate wealth transfer tax apparatus. On the other
hand, statistical generalizations may mask significant instances of wealth
concentration, and perhaps society should not tolerate even a relatively
small and/or short-term hereditary economic aristocracy.22
17. Henry J. Aaron & Alicia H. Munnell, Reassessing the Role for Wealth Transfer
Taxes, 45 NAT'L TAX J. 119, 138-39 (1992); Eugene Steuerle, U.S. Treas. Dept., Equity and
the Taxation of Wealth Transfers, OTA Paper 39 (June 1980) (both arguing that lifetime tax
base should be earnings plus gratuitous accessions).
18. David Joulfian, U.S. Treas. Dept., The Distribution and Division of Bequests: Evi-
dence from the Collation Study 8-10, OTA Paper 71 (Aug. 1994) (describing tendency of
surviving spouse to leave property equally among children).
19. Although a basic principle of trust law is impartiality between income beneficiaries
and remainders, the income beneficiaries (being alive and known) can bring pressure on
trustees to favor themselves. Traditionally, trusts have invested 50-60% in debt obligations
which guarantee income but lose principal value due to inflation. Robert B. Wolf, Defeat-
ing the Duty to Disappoint Equally-The Total Return Trust, 32 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.
J. 45 (1997).
20. James B. Davies, The Relative Impact of Inheritance and Other Factors on Eco-
nomic Inequality, 97 Q.J. ECON. 495 (1982); Uneasy Case, supra note 4, at 354.
21. ALAN S. BLINDER, TOWARD AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION
137-39 (1974).
22. Eric Rakowski, Transferring Wealth Liberally, 51 TAX L. REV. 419, 455 (1996)
[hereinafter Transferring Wealth] (arguing that taxation of unearned wealth at higher rates
could be justified even if earnings of legatees tend to regress to the mean).
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C. REDEFINING THE AIM OF TAXING WEALTH TRANSFERS
The proponents of the wealth transfer taxes have allowed the oppo-
nents to frame the debate. The opponents refer to the transfer taxes vari-
ously as a tax on death (conveying the message that the suffering of
bereaved widows and orphans is compounded by financial sacrifice), or as
a tax on success (and, by implication, a penalty on moral virtue). 23 And a
defense of the tax on the basis of curbing undue accumulations of wealth
is swatted aside by claiming that wealth accumulation (by entrepreneurs
and investors) is a good thing, and (as noted above) that concentrated
wealth doesn't stay concentrated anyway. 24 Finally, there is no objective
standard (or consensus) on what is an "undue" wealth accumulation; the
target tends to recede into the distance.25
The message needs to be conveyed that any tax on gratuitous transfers
is really a tax on gratuitous transferees (other than the surviving spouse).
Purely as a matter of objective fact, a wealth transfer tax cannot curb the
accumulation of wealth of the accumulating individual. 26 Any kind of tax
on wealth transfers by its very nature reduces the net accessions of gratui-
tous transferees. Gratuitous receipts (by persons other than the surviving
spouse) are passive "unearned" and "windfall" income. Such income (at
a certain point) does the legatees and us more harm than good by creat-
ing disincentives to engage in productive economic activity. A tax on the
receipt of unearned wealth (over a certain level) can directly reduce ine-
quality of opportunity. 27 It may even be worthwhile to link revenues
23. See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, Grave Robbers: The Moral Case Against the Death
Tax, 85 TAx NOTES 1429 (1999).
24. The conventional wisdom is that an annual wealth tax is unconstitutional as an
unapportioned "direct tax." Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895),
postulated that a tax on rental income from property was a "direct tax" on the property
itself and, therefore, unconstitutional because it is not apportioned among the states in
proportion to population. Pollock was countered by the Sixteenth Amendment, which
provides that an "income tax" (even if a direct tax) is not subject to the apportionment
requirement. One might turn Pollock on its head: if an income tax is really a property tax,
then a property tax (at least one in which the rate was less than a very conservative income
yield) could be called an income tax, and thereby valid under the Sixteenth Amendment
without regard to apportionment. Nevertheless, I would not bet on Congress considering
enactment of an annual wealth tax anytime in the foreseeable future, and (if it did) I
wouldn't bet on the Supreme Court holding that an annual wealth tax is either an income
tax or an indirect tax.
25. The motto might be: "Tax the very wealthy, that is, the people who are a lot richer
than us middle-class folks." Since legal academics, media owners, top journalists, members
of Congress, and high-level government officials are themselves likely to be (at least) in the
upper middle class (top 85-98th percentile in terms of income or wealth), it is not astonish-
ing that there is now little political support for a meaningful wealth transfer tax.
26. It is conceivable that the existence of the transfer tax might cause a person to
decrease wealth-acquisition activity, but it is also possible that the tax might increase such
activity. Another possible effect might be neutrality with respect to acquiring wealth but
the creation of an incentive to either consume or save more than would have occurred
without the tax. There is no consensus on how these incentives actually operate and, in any
event, this issue will be ignored since any wealth transfer tax would impose parallel
incentives.
27. These arguments are spelled out in Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89
MIcH. L. REV. 69 (1990).
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from wealth transfer taxes to programs aimed to alleviate such inequali-
ties.28 Finally, accumulations of unearned wealth allow a person to exer-
cise unearned and unjustified power over others.
D. EXEMPTION AND RATE STRUCTURES
Rates and exemptions are so closely linked that they will be discussed
in tandem.
1. Utility Curves
Justifications of multi-tier progressive rate structures are often couched
in terms of the declining marginal utility of money.29 Applying this con-
cept to an estate tax is hazardous due to various possible motives for the
making of bequests. Thus, a person with low bequest motives (who saves
for retirement or future emergency but dies prematurely) would be insen-
sitive to estate tax rates, as would a compulsive wealth accumulator. For
a person who might be sensitive to estate tax rates, a large exemption
(effectively a zero rate) would appear to be excessively generous. In any
event, anything like a universal utility curve for bequests seems implausi-
ble.30 It is hard to conceive of any theory that would justify the current
rate system that, after exhaustion of a very large exemption, effectively
starts at a 41% rate and tops off at only a 50% rate.31
The idea of a progressive rate structure is more promising with respect
to the transferees, who are the ones whose wealth is increased by gratui-
tous receipts. But the idea of declining marginal utility to the transferee
presupposes a cumulative tax base that encompasses more than the cur-
rent gratuitous receipt. Obviously, an inheritance tax does not cumulate
gratuitous accessions from a particular decedent with anything else, and
an accessions tax cumulates current gratuitous accessions only with gratu-
itous accessions in prior years. Prior gratuitous accessions may be of spe-
cial interest, but they are still only a subcategory of total transferee
wealth at a given point in time or of total income for a period. A person
with a large total of cumulative gratuitous accessions may possess a low
stock of current wealth or may currently reside in a low income tax
bracket. In any event, the declining marginal utility concept cannot jus-
tify a large lifetime exemption.
Only the income-inclusion approach cumulates gratuitous accessions
with other income of the taxpayer during the year, without special ex-
28. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTr, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY (1999);
RONALD CHESTER, INHERITANCE, WEALTH, AND SOCIETY 165-89 (1982).
29. SIMONS, supra note 5, at 1-20; WALTER J. BLUM AND HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE
UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION (1953); 3 ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION,
REPORT, supra note 5, at 1-24 (using concept of "discretionary income").
30. Barbara H. Fried, Who Gets Utility from Bequests? The Distributive and Welfare
Implications for a Consumption Tax, 51 STAN. L. REV. 641 (1999).
31. An exemption of $1 million delivered through the unified credit of §§ 2010 and
2505 has the effect of taxing the first dollar of the tax base in excess of $1 million at a 41%
rate under § 2001(c).
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emption. This feature of an income-inclusion system renders plausible
the idea of progressive rates based on the declining-marginal utility idea.
2. The Windfall Idea
A possible argument for preferring an accessions or inheritance tax to
the income-inclusion approach is the notion that gratuitous accessions are
inherently windfalls and should be subject to a separate rate schedule
with higher rates than the income tax. There are two possible notions of
what constitutes a windfall. One view (but not the conventional one)
might be that a windfall is unearned or undeserved income. 32 Such a def-
inition, however, smacks of being conjured up solely to justify an acces-
sions or inheritance tax. This concept of windfall also subverts the
concept of a lifetime exemption, which has been viewed as an integral
feature of an accessions tax, and it sits uneasily with any multi-tier pro-
gressive rate schedule. 33 But if a flat rate system is adopted with no life-
time exemption, what remains is simply an income tax on gratuitous
accessions at a special rate. 34
The usual notion of "windfall" refers to some unexpected "surplus"
relative to one's normal "expectations. '35 But this notion of windfall ex-
tends beyond gratuitous accessions to encompass such other gains as
found objects, prizes and awards, lottery winnings, and perhaps extraordi-
nary investment gains (at least those attributable to blind luck). No tax
system, however, has ever moved in this direction. In addition, the ex-
pectations concept of windfall is subjective and vague. In some cases,
gratuitous accessions (annual gifts, trust distributions) may actually create
a person's normal expectations. Any generalizations about the relation
of gratuitous accessions to a person's other economic prospects is so haz-
ardous as to subvert the notion, basic to an accessions or inheritance tax,
that accessions should be subject to a separate rate and exemption sys-
tem.36 Whatever justifications ("poverty level," "declining marginal util-
ity of money," or "non-discretionary income") exist for income tax
exemptions and low marginal rates "at the bottom" also apply to windfall
income. This point suggests that windfall income should be treated as any
other income, and also that it should be reckoned on an annual basis. An
32. Only children (etc.) who actually contribute (without compensation) to the dece-
dent's economic activities can legitimately claim to be outside of the windfall category, but
a rational tax system would not want to be burdened with sorting factual claims along these
lines. In addition, the children of the wealthy are not likely to perform substantial free
services for their parents.
33. See Halbach, supra note 11, at 231-33 (favoring a flat rate on simplicity grounds).
34. Although the income tax generally does not follow a schedular system, net capital
gains are systematically subjected to lower rates, § 1(h), and accumulated trust income is
mostly taxed at the highest individual rate, § 1(e).
35. The windfall idea possibly lies behind that feature of the inheritance tax that im-
poses steeper rate schedules (with lower exemptions) as the degree of relationship of the
legatee to the decedent decreases. Differential rate structures discriminate (inter alia)
against accessions from a partner in a committed relationship, and they violate the princi-
ple of neutrality among potential legatees for no worthwhile purpose.
36. The windfall theory is critically discussed in Jantscher, supra note 6, at 49-51.
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issue then is whether income-averaging should be allowed for windfall
income in excess of some specified amount. Disallowing income averag-
ing would be a backhand way of imposing a "surtax" on windfalls, but it
would also create an incentive for transferors to leave bequests in a form
that entailed periodic payouts. This incentive might be neutralized by
imposing a flat rate on accessions income in cases where income from
other sources exceeds a certain level (say, $50,000).
3. Redistribution
The tenuous relationship of estate (and inheritance) tax rates and ex-
emptions to the issues of curbing undue accumulations of wealth and mit-
igating unjust inequalities of opportunity has already been commented
upon.37
The income-inclusion system, which has no fixed-dollar exemptions, is
not explicitly tailored to redistributive goals, although it would, of course,
further them. If the income-inclusion system were deemed not to have
sufficient "punch" at the level of the super rich, it could be combined
with an accessions (or estate) tax having a generous exemption. Even
without being combined with a wealth transfer tax, an income-inclusion
system would probably extract a much greater amount of tax revenue
from relatively well-off families than would alternative systems, because
(lacking exemptions) the aggregate tax base would be vastly larger. At
the same time, the income-inclusion approach would reach lower down
the economic ladder, and that might be its political Achilles heel, unless
the potentially huge revenue harvest could be linked to a general income
tax rate reduction.
The major accessions tax proposals simply assume the fact of a quite
substantial lifetime exemption by analogy to the estate and gift tax, with-
out attempting to independently justify it.38 The size of the estate tax
exemption seems to be linked to a political balancing act of maintaining a
meaningful revenue flow while exempting roughly 98% of decedents
(which translates into targeting only the super rich). Assuming arguendo
that there should be some meaningful lifetime accessions tax exemption
system, its size and structure should be constituted according to its partic-
ular redistributive rationales, which are more specific than the vague idea
of curbing "undue" accumulations of wealth. Thus, any exemption "at
the bottom" should be set according to some notion of "unfair inequality
of opportunity." Whatever view one might have as to what constitutes an
"unfair" advantage to a person receiving gratuitous accessions, surely it
must kick in at a level far below the current estate tax exemption. I
would suggest $100,000, roughly the amount that would finance (tax free)
37. See text supra Part I.B.
38. Andrews, supra note 11, at 592 ($24,000 exemption, comparable to the then estate
tax exemption of $30,000); Halbach, supra note 11, at 232 ($700,000 exemption, compara-
ble to the then estate tax exemption of $600,000).
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a good education. 39 On the other hand, if (as is suggested below) educa-
tional and other in-kind consumption benefits are automatically ex-
cluded, then the case for any fixed-dollar lifetime exemption, over some
de minimis amount for cash accessions, drastically weakens. I offer no
opinion on what the rate structure would look like above the exemption.
Two of the justifications for an accessions tax (inequality of opportu-
nity and removing the tax disincentive for gainful employment) wane as
the transferee advances in age, but the third (concentrations of unearned
wealth) does not.40 This observation could be accommodated by increas-
ing any first-tier exemption (in stages or all at once) after the taxpayer
advances past, say, age 30, and by increasing it again as the transferee's
age advances beyond, say, age 60.4 1
4. Dispersing Wealth
Under current law, the per-transferor exemption under the unified es-
tate and gift tax is $1 million. The estate tax exemption is scheduled to
rise to $3.5 million by 2009.42 On top of that, there is a generation-skip-
ping tax (GST) exclusion of $1 million keyed to the initial transfer;43 that
exclusion grows in tandem with the growth in trust corpus and can shelter
multiple successive generation-skipping transfers. 44 This system of per-
transferor exemptions provides no incentive to disperse wealth among
legatees. Stated differently, an estate tax is "neutral" between dispersion
and non-dispersion, but that is not necessarily a good thing. In any case,
a given transferee can obtain exempt gratuitous transfers from numerous
transferors without limit, and thereby amass a vast amount of untaxed,
unearned wealth.
Under an inheritance tax, exemptions (and progressive rate schedules)
operate on a per-legatee basis. This system creates an incentive for a
decedent to disperse legacies among multiple legatees. Although dece-
dents tend to treat their descendants equally at each generation, an inher-
itance tax might operate to somewhat increase the total level of
39. The 1968 ALI accessions tax proposal had a per transferee exemption of $24,000.
Andrews, supra note 11, at 592.
40. A related problem is that of successive accessions of the same property within a
short time span. See infra text accompanying notes 123-25.
41. Cf INS-rIUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES, THE STRUCTURE AND REFORM OF DIRECT
TAXATION 317-49 (1978) [hereinafter Meade Report]; Wealth Taxes, supra note 10, at 334-
47 (both suggesting that an accessions tax might be a function of the holding period of
gratuitously-acquired wealth). Any system under which the tax is a function of holding
period would necessitate some arbitrary convention for later consumption and wealth
transfers "back" to gratuitous accessions received. The holding period concept would cer-
tainly be out of place in an income-inclusion system.
42. I.R.C. § 2010(c) (2002). The gift tax exemption is scheduled to stay at $1 million.
I.R.C. § 2505(a)(1) (2002).
43. See I.R.C. § 2631(a), (c) (2002) (exemption indexed for inflation).
44. The per-transferor exemption is allocated to the transferor's various generation-
skipping transfers and trusts under I.R.C. § 2632 (2002). The exclusion amount divided by
the net transfer creates an exclusion ratio that, when subtracted from the number 1.0, pro-
duces an "inclusion ratio" that applies to all generation-skipping transfers with respect to
the property transferred. See I.R.C. §§ 2641-42 (2002).
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dispersal. 45 At the same time, a legatee under an inheritance tax can take
advantage of multiple per-transferor exemptions with respect to different
decedents, and thereby amass a large stock of unearned wealth.46
Both the accessions tax and the income inclusion-system favor disper-
sal. This incentive would operate far more strongly under an accessions
tax having exemptions than under an income-inclusion system providing
for no exemptions and imposing a high tax rate on the unearned income
of persons under the age of 14.47 Both major accessions tax proposals
(which posit large fixed-dollar exemptions) react to this "scattering" in-
centive by imposing additional taxes on transfers beyond the first genera-
tion below the transferor, in the name of "neutrality. ' 48 In my view,
these anti-scattering approaches increase complexity without convincing
justification. First, if a reason for preferring an accessions tax is to en-
courage scattering, it hardly makes sense to neuter that incentive. Sec-
ond, merely stating that taxes can be reduced by scattering does not mean
that the behavior of transferors would be significantly affected. Since the
accessions tax is imposed only on actual receipts, the problem cannot be
described in terms of "illusory" or "phantom" beneficiaries, as is the case
under the GST.49 A person will not receive accessions unless the trans-
feror seriously intends that such person be benefited for non-tax reasons.
It is legitimate and reasonable to by-pass one's well-off children in favor
of younger beneficiaries. If a person receiving an accession doesn't really
want or need it, he or she should be able to pass it on by way of qualified
disclaimer without adverse tax consequences. Next, even if there is a se-
rious neutrality problem, there is an easier (and more precise) way of
dealing with it, namely, by adopting a flat rate system with no per-tax-
payer exemptions. Finally, the fact that revenues may be reduced in the
45. A minor defect in both the estate tax and the typical inheritance tax from the
wealth-dispersion angle is that the decedent has the power to allocate the burden of taxes
under her will. Thus, the tax burden can (in theory) be allocated to smaller legacies, leav-
ing the larger legacies intact. This is not likely to occur in practice, since tax burdens are
usually apportioned among taxable transfers on a pro rata basis or all to the residue, which
usually contains the bulk of the probate estate. The ability to allocate tax burdens is con-
sistent with the value of freedom of testation, but it is contrary to the notion, implicit in a
transferee-oriented gratuitous transfer tax, that the tax should be borne by the transferees
in accordance with what they receive. The transferor would have no direct control over the
allocation of tax burdens under an income-inclusion system or an accession tax. Although
estimated tax liabilities of transferees could be factored into the size of gratuitous transfers,
the transferor might lack the requisite transferee-specific information, and such fine tuning
would certainly annoy at least some of the transferees.
46. That is, each transferor can make bequests that come within per-transferee exemp-
tions applicable to that transferor.
47. .R.C. § 1(g) (2002) (known as the "kiddie tax").
48. Andrews, supra note 11, at 592 (creating a deduction for accessions from immedi-
ate relations); Halbach, supra note 11, at 240-48 (creating an elaborate system imposing an
additional tax on accessions from non-immediate relatives that is structured like a genera-
tion-skipping tax). Whether generation-skipping is an issue divorced from scattering is
considered infra following note 96.
49. See I.R.C. § 2652(c)(2) (2002) (stating that nominal interests are disregarded
where the purpose is to postpone imposition of the GST).
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short run5° solely on account of multiple per-transferee exemptions and
lower rates is inconsequential, first, because raising revenue is not the
principal purpose of the system, and second, because other features of the
system can be tweaked to make up for any revenue shortfall.
A per-transferee exemption system would seem to be untenable in the
face of complex trusts having multiple current and successive benefi-
ciaries, the interests in which cannot be accurately valued ex ante. As will
be more fully explained below, the answer is simple; inclusion in the tax
base is deferred until the actual receipt of cash or property (as opposed to
the acquisition of an interest or expectancy in property). This operating
principle avoids the problem of valuing interests ex ante, but it does raise
the specter of deferral, which is discussed later.5 '
E. SUMMARY OF PART I
Briefly, an estate tax has little to be said for it either from an internal-
to-tax perspective or from an external-to-tax perspective. 52 The only
(possibly) positive aspect of aii estate tax is that it is neutral with respect
to the concentration vs. dispersal of gratuitous transfers. Any transferee-
oriented tax on wealth transfers is preferable to an estate tax in theory
and is easier to justify. The inheritance tax provides some incentive for
the dispersal of wealth, but is flawed because the tax base is unrelated to
the other wealth, income, or gratuitous accessions of the transferee.
Other than rates and exemptions, an inheritance tax is structured like an
estate tax and will be so treated in Part II below.
An accessions tax ties into the concept of an individual's cumulative
unearned wealth, but does not connect to existing wealth or periodic in-
come. Whether the concept of an accessions tax really posits a large per-
transferee lifetime exemption is doubtful, but if exemptions are allowed
they should be relatively modest and should relate to one or more pur-
poses of the accessions tax. An income-inclusion system would contain
no lifetime exemption but would treat a taxable gratuitous receipt like
any other item of gross income (except for the possibility of income aver-
aging). Such a system would advance, if not be specifically tailored to,
concerns relating specifically to unearned, inherited wealth.
Apart from rates and exemption structures, the income-inclusion and
accessions tax approaches would operate similarly, as will become appar-
ent in Part II. This point suggests the possibility of some "hybrid" in-
come-accessions tax, where the rate and/or exemption features of one tax
are imported into the other, or else the possibility that an income-inclu-
sion approach be combined with an "supplementary" accessions tax.
50. If lower-generation legatees receive early accessions, their respective exemptions
and lower rate brackets will be exhausted earlier.
51. See infra text accompanying notes 137-55.
52. It might be claimed that a one-time estate tax is the easiest transfer tax to adminis-
ter, but with computers and information reporting requirements imposed on transferors it
is not clear that this would be the case.
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II. STRUCTURAL ISSUES RELATING TO THE TAXATION OF
GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS AND RECEIPTS
This Part deals with an analysis of the appropriate roles, if any, of ma-
jor structural features, namely, the treatment of inter-spousal transfers,
the relevance of the generational concept, gift exclusions, timing issues,
and valuation issues, in relation to one or more plausible goals of a tax on
gratuitous transfers or receipts.
A. TAXATION OF MARRIED COUPLES
Gratuitous transfers from one spouse to another raise two principal
issues: (1) the scope of any marital exclusion or deduction and (2) the
qualification rules. The current estate tax treats husband and wife as sep-
arate taxpayers, 53 but allows an unlimited marital deduction for qualified
transfers under complex qualification rules.54
1. Inter Vivos Transfers Between Spouses
Regardless of what theoretical construct of marriage one might favor,
practical considerations overwhelmingly favor the unlimited tax free
treatment of inter vivos transfers between spouses, under any system of
taxing gratuitous transfers. Such considerations include: (1) transfers
upon divorce would be free of tax, 55 (2) transfers in the nature of "sup-
port" would be tax-free 56 (and it would be difficult to erect a clear dis-
tinction between "gift" and "support"), (3) transfers between spouses
would be ignored for income tax purposes under § 1041, (4) spouses often
share (or alternate) the possession and enjoyment of assets, (5) the legal
ownership of tangible personal property (other than vehicles) is often
hard to determine, and (6) transfers and understandings between spouses
would be hard to detect (and would we want the IRS to be able to pierce
the veil of privacy?).
53. Conceivably, husband and wife could be treated as a single unit with a unique rate
and exemption structure, but it would seem that any such single-unit concept would (as
with the joint return for income tax purposes) ultimately serve as a transfer- or accession-
splitting device. The single-unit approach would necessitate rules for the formation and
liquidation of the unit (by divorce and death) and the reconstitution of units by remarriage.
For a lengthy attempt to sort out the estate and gift tax issues posed by a single-unit theory,
see Harry L. Gutman, Reforming Wealth Transfer Taxes After ERTA, 69 VA. L. REV. 1183,
1219-39 (1985). The single-unit idea also has its conceptual downside. For example, in the
estate tax context, either spouse could use up the full double exemption during life, with-
out the other spouse's consent, and leave no exemption or lower brackets for the other
spouse to use. Under an accessions tax, a high-accessions person could marry a low-acces-
sions person, use up the latter's exemption against new accessions, then obtain a divorce
and end up with all of the accessioned property, while leaving the other spouse with no
exemption.
54. See I.R.C. §§ 2056(b) (estate tax), 2522(b)-(f) (gift tax) (2002).
55. See I.R.C. § 2516 (2002).
56. A support payment or transfer is not a transfer made "by gift" as required in
§ 2501(a)(1). See also Rev. Rul. 68-379, 1968-2 C.B. 414 (1998).
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2. Scope of Deduction or Exclusion for Estate Transfers Between
Spouses
Theoretical, as well as practical, considerations weigh on the issue of
whether, and to what extent, interspousal estate transfers should be de-
ducted or excluded.
a. Theoretical Approaches to Tax-Free Spousal Estate Transfers
What exactly might justify the tax-free death-time transfer of wealth to
a surviving spouse? The argument that husband and wife are a continu-
ing single unit is conclusory and question-begging, and posits unpalatable
consequences. 57
An initially plausible theory is the "support" (or "welfare") theory,
which would posit the ideal that the surviving spouse should be entitled
to receive a tax-free annuity that maintains her at (or near) her accus-
tomed standard of living for her remaining life. This theory accords with
the concept of permanent alimony, but that concept has now largely been
abandoned in the United States in the divorce context and never has had
a meaningful place in the inheritance context,5 8 and, therefore, cannot
pull much weight in the tax context. It certainly cannot justify an unlim-
ited marital deduction. Under an estate, inheritance, or accessions tax,
the exemptions already can be said to implement the welfare idea. 59 A
system in which surviving spouses having considerable wealth, either on
their own or resulting from very large bequests, would avoid any and all
tax on spousal estate transfers cannot be justified under any support
theory.
An unlimited marital deduction under the estate tax is said to carry out
a "deferral" theory, i.e., that tax should be deferred until the death of the
surviving spouse. This seems more like a description of how an unlimited
estate tax marital deduction operates than a theory. Deferral makes no
sense unless it is the surviving spouse alone who benefits from the defer-
57. Implementing the single-unit theory would allow the decedent spouse to appropri-
ate the exemption of the surviving spouse, leaving the latter with no exemption for her own
estate. No proposal along these lines has been, or is likely to be, made.
58. See LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW 597-98 (3d ed.
2002); Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of Inheritance Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 199,
205-40 (2001) (critiquing lack of influence of welfare concept in family property law).
Many states provide for a so-called "widow's allowance" out of the decedent's estate, but
such an amount is of short duration and small in amount. A few states may allow an
income interest in trust in a fraction of the decedent's estate to satisfy (or preclude) the
spousal election against the will, but in no way is the income interest keyed to the surviving
spouse's accustomed standard of living, and an income interest in a fraction of the estate is
(obviously) worth less than a fee interest in the same fraction. Common law dower in kind
has now been abolished in virtually every jurisdiction.
59. The welfare theory would also justify a deduction or exclusion for other "support
obligation" situations, such as for minor children and the committed partners of gays and
lesbians. However, the property system does not give such persons significant rights in a
decedent's estate. From 1977 through 1981 there was an "orphan's deduction" of limited
scope designated as I.R.C. § 2057, but it was repealed on the ground that the increased
exemption was sufficient to shelter such transfers from tax.
[Vol. 56
COMPARING A REFORMED ESTATE TAX
ral, which is not the case under the current qualification rules. Finally,
the concept implies deferral of the putative tax on the decedent's estate
(with interest), not deferral of the tax base.
The deferral theory cannot operate in the context of an accessions or
income tax because it is not possible to shift wealth from the tax base of
one spouse to that of another by estate transfer. The accessions or in-
come tax base of an individual, constituted by gratuitous receipts, cannot
be reduced by gratuitous transfers without undermining the whole pre-
mise of the tax.
Another theory is the notion that a wealth transfer tax should be
thought of as a once-per-generation wealth tax. The once-per-generation
idea is critiqued below in Section B, and would seem to have no rele-
vance to the purposes of an accessions tax or to an income tax that inher-
ently operates on an annual basis. Even accepting the premise that a
wealth transfer tax should be imposed once per generation, it is not clear
why spouses should per se be considered to be in the same generation,
regardless of relative ages and regardless of the length of time between
their deaths, especially if the couple has no living descendants.
Far more promising is the partnership theory because, if the spouses
are viewed as separate partners in a marital partnership, death causes the
partnership to dissolve, and, therefore, each spouse's "equity" interest
therein is liquidated. The taking of property that is one's "own" should,
of course, be tax free (i.e., there is no "real" transfer upon liquidation).
The extent to which a tax-free liquidation may be deemed to occur might
be determined with reference to marital liquidation rights under state
law. In the case of community property, each spouse has a right to one-
half. Other "absolute" liquidation rights include elective share rights60
and undivided interests in co-owned property. As a crude generalization,
liquidation rights of surviving spouses on death might be said to fall
within the 30-50% range. It would be reasonable for the tax law to adopt
a 50% across-the-board rule, rather than simply following state law, be-
cause the 50% approach avoids geographical inequities. The historic
(1948) rationale of the marital deduction was precisely to create equality
between common-law and community property systems, but the 1948
rules operated crudely by limiting the marital deduction to 50% of only
the decedent's adjusted gross estate6' (excluding interests in community
60. The estate tax has treated a surviving spouse's dower, elective share, and intestacy
rights as not rising to the level of any kind of fractional ownership in property. See I.R.C.
§ 2034 (2002). Cf I.R.C. § 2043(b) (2002) (release of such rights not treated as considera-
tion in money or money's worth). The 1976 enactment of § 2040(b) results in jointly-
owned property being treated the same as community property for estate tax purposes.
61. The term "adjusted gross estate" means the gross estate reduced by deductible
claims and administration expenses. The adjusted gross estate concept unnecessarily com-
plicates tax compliance and planning, as well as estate administration. First, the amount of
deductible claims may require some time to sort out, and second, there is an election to
deduct administration expenses (which may have to be estimated) for income or estate tax
purposes or § 642(j), and this election would affect the amount of the adjusted gross estate.
Moreover, if community property is the tax norm, it is noteworthy that in a community
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property). The co-ownership ideal would be "accurately" carried out, in
cases where the wealthier spouse dies first, by imposing a limitation on
the amount of deductible or excludable marital transfers equal to that
amount which produces an equal division of aggregate spousal wealth.
b. The Pragmatic Case for an Unlimited Estate Tax Marital
Deduction
Under an estate tax, it would be claimed that the aggregate-estate-split-
ting approach would be too difficult and costly to implement, because the
surviving spouse's wealth (estate) would have to be inventoried and val-
ued at the time of the decedent spouse's death, along with the estate of
the decedent spouse. Also, since the limitation would shrink (or disap-
pear) as the surviving spouse's wealth increased, an incentive would exist
to conceal the surviving spouse's assets. These claims strike me as greatly
overstated, however. The interests of the surviving spouse in community
property and jointly-owned property would be automatically valued at an
amount equal (or proportionate) to the value of the decedent's includ-
able interests in the same property. Publicly traded securities could also
be readily valued, as well as annuities and insurance company products.
Closely-held businesses would need to be valued to determine the value
of any interests held by the decedent spouse, and the same principles
would be used to value the interests of the surviving spouse. All of these
assets could be readily "discovered" by the IRS and estate administrators,
as would other kinds of registered property, such as motor vehicles. The
problem of "concealed assets" would not be unique to the assets of a
surviving spouse.
A better objection to any kind of estate tax marital deduction limita-
tion is that it would operate as a trap for the unwary. With a limitation in
place, ill-advised decedents might effect non-deductible estate transfers
that will be taxable to the surviving spouse, resulting in double taxation of
the same wealth. 62 Even if double taxation is avoided, a limitation
"forces" a dual-transfer dispositive plan, with one set of transfers qualify-
ing for the marital deduction and the other set not qualifying.
EXAMPLE 1: H has $1.4 million of wealth and W $0.6 million. As-
sume that there is no exemption. Suppose H, being poorly advised,
leaves everything to W in a form that qualifies for the marital deduc-
tion. The marital deduction is limited to $0.4 million, so that H is
taxed on $1 million of the $1.4 million. On W's death her estate is $2
million, which is fully taxed. This disastrous result can be avoided if
H transfers the nondeductible $1 million in a form that does not
property system all or most of the claims and administration expenses would be charged
against the decedent's share of the community property, whereas under the adjusted gross
estate concept half are effectively charged against the surviving spouse's share.
62. Double taxation can only be visited upon nondeductible transfers. Under a system
that imposes a limitation on the estate tax marital deduction, nondeductible estate trans-
fers are a virtual certainty.
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qualify for the marital deduction and is not included in W's gross
estate.
The practical argument for an unlimited estate tax marital deduction is
that it achieves the same end result as can be reached under aggregate
estate splitting with proper planning (taxing the aggregate spousal wealth
once) but without being a trap for the unwary and without forcing a two-
transfer dispositive scheme.63
EXAMPLE 2: Same facts as Example 1, except that there is no limita-
tion on the marital deduction. H makes a marital deduction bequest
of $1.4 million to W. H's taxable estate is zero and W's taxable estate
is $2 million.
But some say this is not good enough, because each spouse has a sepa-
rate exemption and lower marginal rates, and these features produce the
same dual-transfer incentives as would occur under an estate tax marital
deduction limitation.
EXAMPLE 3: Same facts and assumptions (including an unlimited
marital deduction) as example 2, but assume also that each spouse
has an unused exemption of $1 million. If H leaves everything to W
in a form that qualifies for the marital deduction, H's taxable estate
will be zero by reason of the marital deduction, but H's exemption
will have been wasted. W's taxable estate will be $2 million (assum-
ing no changes in value), half of which will be sheltered by W's ex-
emption. This problem can be avoided if H leaves $0.4 million in a
marital deduction bequest and $1 million in a by-pass trust, as in Ex-
ample 1.
This analysis leads to alternative conclusions, one being that we might
as well opt for a limitation system based on the idea of aggregate estate
splitting; the other being to seek an alternate cure for the unused exemp-
tion problem. However, in situations where spousal wealth is greater
than the combined exemptions, an unlimited marital deduction provides
an incentive to use the unlimited marital deduction to the extent of all of
the decedent's estate in excess of the decedent spouse's exemption. Al-
though this optimal deferral strategy may be inferior to an estate splitting
strategy in some cases, 64 the deferral strategy is widely adhered to, and
probably rules out any return to a limitation system. It turns out that
bequest neutrality can be obtained under an unlimited marital deduction
by adding a rule allowing one spouse to "bequeath" his or her unused
63. The textual discussion has assumed that the wealthier spouse dies first. Under a
marital-deduction limitation, the limitation would be zero if the poorer spouse died first.
There is no good reason to "force" transfers by the poorer spouse into a nonqualifying
form to avoid the likelihood of double taxation. An unlimited estate tax marital deduction
solves that problem.
64. Don W. Llewellyn et al., Computing the Optimum Marital Deduction: Is a Zero-
Tax Formula Appropriate?, 24 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 331, 338-40 (1989); Jeffrey N.
Pennell & R. Mark Williamson, The Economics of Prepaying Wealth Transfer Tax, TR. &




exemption to the other spouse (but not in an amount that exceeds quali-
fying marital-deduction estate transfers). 65
EXAMPLE 4: Same facts and assumptions as Example 3. H be-
queaths $1.4 million to W in a form that qualifies for the marital
deduction. H would have a taxable estate of zero on account of the
marital deduction, and W would have a taxable estate of $2 million,
but it would be offset by a $2 million exemption (half of which would
be acquired from H, who didn't use any of it).
The bequest-neutrality rationale66 for allowing unused exemptions to
pass to the surviving spouse is that the decedent spouse could have used
the exemption but was dissuaded from doing so by the structure of the tax
system itself (specifically, the unlimited estate tax marital deduction).
This rationale dictates that a decedent's unused exemption be allowed to
pass to the surviving spouse only to the extent that it would have been used
by the decedent spouse in the absence of the marital deduction. Thus, the
passing-on of the exemption remaining after non-deductible transfers
should be limited to the amount of marital-deduction estate transfers. 67
Although this system would "allow" a single-transfer scheme for the
wealthier spouse, it would not require it. The estate-splitting (dual trans-
fer) option would be available to decedent spouses and may be preferable
on either tax or non-tax grounds. Tax grounds might exist if a progressive
rate schedule (as opposed to a flat rate) were to apply above the exemp-
tion level, since estate splitting would minimize aggregate taxes. Non-tax
grounds might include the provision for children of a prior marriage.
If the poorer spouse were to die first, her unused exemption amount
would pass on to the surviving spouse only to the extent of marital deduc-
tion transfers. 68 The non-passed-on portion of the exemption would be
lost. Community property couples would possess an advantage in this
respect, because the longer the marriage lasts, the more likely it is that
spousal wealth would be allocated evenly as the result of the operation of
community property law. For spouses outside of a community property
system, the unequal-wealth problem could be remedied by the wealthier
spouse making tax-free gifts to or for the benefit of the poorer spouse
65. See Report on Transfer Tax Restructuring, 41 TAX LAW. 395, 398-400 (1988).
66. As stated supra note 53, although a single-unit theory might also justify such a
result, it would equally allow the decedent spouse to appropriate the maximum amount of
the aggregate spousal exemption. Thus, H (in Example 4) could bequeath all $1.4 million
to C tax-free, leaving nothing to W and leaving W with a remaining exemption of $0.6
million, which would be unpleasant if W's estate were to grow above $0.6 million.
67. A serial widow should be able to accumulate unused exemptions from various
husbands, because the rationale for allowing the exemption to be passed on is not tied to a
"single marital unit" theory and is not affected by the poorer spouse's prior marital or tax
history.
68. For example, assume an exemption of $1 million, none of which has been previ-
ously used by W, who has a net estate of $160,000, and who leaves $40,000 to C and the
residue ($120,000) to H. The unused exemption is $960,000, but only $120,000 more of it
could have been used if marital-deduction transfers had been foregone.
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that would be included in the poorer spouse's transfer tax base.69 If the
wealthier spouse were unwilling to make such gifts, the wealthier spouse
should not obtain the benefit of the poorer spouse's unused exemption.
A rule that allowed a poorer spouse's unused exemption to pass to a
wealthier spouse would create an inducement for a wealthy person to
marry a poor person in bad health simply to obtain additional exemption
amounts, a process that could be repeated serially. Such an inducement
would require an antitidote in the form of a rule allowing the IRS to
attack tax-motivated marriages of dubious substance.
c. The Marital Exclusion Under the Accessions Tax Should be
Limited
Assuming that inter vivos transfers between spouses would be exempt
from accessions tax,70 it remains to be seen whether there should be an
unlimited spousal exclusion for inter-spousal death-time transfers. Previ-
ous commentators have simply assumed that an unlimited marital exemp-
tion would be warranted by analogy to the estate tax.71 This assumption
is too facile. The idea of a marital exclusion needs to be harmonized with
the underlying concept of an accessions tax. It is my view that an unlim-
ited marital exclusion is not warranted. Basically, the whole idea of an
accessions tax admits of no exclusions according to the identity of the
transferor.
Under an estate tax, aggregate transfers by the marital unit to third
parties are exempted, at most, by an amount equal to the sum of the
spousal exemptions. The unlimited marital deduction, at best, postpones
the taxable event with respect to the taxable amount (the amount in ex-
cess of the spousal exemptions) until the death of the second spouse.
Thus, assuming that each taxpayer has an exemption of $1 million, if ag-
gregate spousal self-made wealth is $10 million, the lowest taxable
amount if $8 million, with the taxable event for all $8 million possibly
being deferred until the death of the second spouse. If there is an unlim-
ited spousal exemption under the accessions tax, there is no tax as the
first spouse's wealth is transferred to the second spouse at the first
spouse's death, and any tax could be deferred at least until the death of
the second spouse. 72  At the death of the second spouse the taxable
69. The wealthier spouse can make a "QTIP trust" gift to the poorer spouse that will
be included in the poorer spouse's transfer tax base but without being subject to the poorer
spouse's dispositive control. See I.R.C. § 2523(f) (2002).
70. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56. But see infra text accompanying notes
76-77 for a possible exception to this rule.
71. Andrews, supra note 11, at 592; Halbach, supra note 11, at 224. Both authors
acknowledge operating under the assumption that major features of an accessions tax
would mimic those of the existing transfer taxes, including (of course) a marital deduction.
72. Deferral is harmless where the tax base increases according to normal rates of
return. In the estate tax, the post-death rate of return can vanish from the tax base by way
of consumption, bad investments, or tax-free gifts. The average period of deferral (period
of survival by surviving spouse) is probably about 8 years. See U.S. Treas. Dept., 91st
Cong., Tax Reform Studies and Proposals 260 (Comm. Print 1969) (citing mortality statis-
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amount would be wholly a function of the unused accessions tax exemp-
tions of the second spouse's legatees, which could be legion. The second
spouse's accessions tax exemption would be helpful only with respect to
gratuitous transfers to such spouse from third parties. The effect of such
an unlimited marital exclusion system would be treat the transferee
spouse as a non-person for accessions tax purposes simply by reason of
being a surviving spouse. Admittedly, apart from the deferral aspect, this
is the same result as would occur if the first spouse bequeathed his or her
wealth directly to the same legatees, bypassing the second spouse. How-
ever, the second spouse is a real person (taxpayer) capable of possessing
and enjoying wealth, not a mere conduit entity like a trust or estate.
Under an unlimited marital exemption, surviving spouses would be able
to amass huge wealth by gratuitous receipt (perhaps as the result of serial
marriages), and it is precisely the aim of an accessions tax that gratuitous
transferees should owe and pay the appropriate amount of tax on such
accumulations of unearned wealth, regardless of the identity of the
transferor.
It does not follow that there should be no marital exclusion whatso-
ever. A system that allowed no marital exclusion would never be enacted
by Congress. Under a partnership theory of marriage (if imperfectly
under property law), roughly half of the aggregate spousal wealth can be
deemed to be already owned by the surviving spouse as of the decedent
spouse's demise. The partnership concept, which avoids geographical dis-
crimination, 73 can be carried out by the following two rules (in addition
to the rule that inter-spousal gifts would be tax free). First, any taxable
accession by either spouse during marriage would (as with taxable in-
come) be attributed 50-50 between the spouses.74 Second, on the death
of one spouse (or upon divorce) the surviving (or "other") spouse would
be able to walk away with at least half of the aggregate spousal wealth
free of tax.
The surviving spouse should not be able to acquire the unused exemp-
tion of the decedent spouse, as any such acquisition would undermine the
purpose of the limitation on spousal estate accessions. If the unused ex-
tics). Deferral under the estate and gift tax does not increase the number of exemptions or
number of taxpayers in low brackets.
73. Under community property law, the surviving (or divorced) spouse actually owns
half of the marital property.
74. There are three possibilities: (1) the accession could be attributed to the actual
transferees in accordance with legal title, (2) the accession could be attributed wholly to
the spouse that stands in the closest degree of relationship to the transferor, or (3) the
accession could be split between the spouses. The first approach has the disadvantage of
providing an unnatural incentive for third parties to make gifts to in-laws in order to take
advantage of unused exemptions. Professor Halbach, favors the second alternative as be-
ing more realistic. Halbach, supra note 11, at 224-25. In my view, there is no telling what is
"realistic" within the marriage. Certainly a person can spend, give, or bequeath (if not use)
only money or property that is legally "hers." I prefer alternative (1) to alternative (2). I
favor alternative (3) partly because it accords with the partnership ideal, partly because the
donors could engage in tax-motivated "donee-splitting," and partly because the "real" do-
nee can share the accession or make a gift of part or all of it to the other spouse free of
accessions tax.
[Vol. 56
COMPARING A REFORMED ESTATE TAX
emption amount were passed on, a person with a large amount of prior
gratuitous accessions and future expectancies could marry a person with a
large unused exemption amount but in relatively poor health in order to
acquire additional exemption amounts. In the worst-case scenario, the
poorer spouse might be stripped of her exemption without obtaining the
benefit of the accessions that were sheltered from tax by reason of it.75
The lack of any limitation with respect to inter vivos gifts would allow
the wealthier spouse, nearing death, to avoid the estate transfer limitation
by effecting unusually large inter vivos transfers to the other spouse.76
Anti-abuse rules would need to be formulated with the aim of treating
certain inter vivos spousal transfers as being "estate" transfers. 77 But one
of the alleged virtues of an accessions tax is not having to distinguish
between inter vivos and estate transfers.
The anti-abuse rules would not be the only practical problem raised by
an exemption limited to half of the aggregate spousal wealth. Unlike an
estate tax, where the transferor's total wealth and the amount of estate
transfers to the surviving spouse are valued as of the decedent's death,
the normal situation under an accessions tax is that the transferor's total
wealth is irrelevant, and the only thing that matters is the current acces-
sion, taxable when received, in relation to prior accessions from all
sources. Spousal accessions with respect to trusts, legal future interests,
and annuities would occur after the decedent spouse's death. About the
only workable approach would be to constitute a fraction, using date-of-
death values, representing the percentage of the deceased spouse's "es-
tate" that would be excludable by the surviving spouse if she were to have
received the maximum amount of excludable "estate" transfers "at" the
deceased spouse's death, and then to apply this fraction against all estate
accessions from the deceased spouse whenever received. If this system
were deemed too complex, Congress could fall back on some simplifying
rule, such as one providing that 50% of any spousal estate accession
would be tax free. This rule would only reach the "correct" result if the
spouse who died first were to own 100% of the spousal wealth.
In any event, assuming some limitation on the exclusion for marital
accessions, the surviving spouse would have her own fixed-dollar exemp-
tion to shelter otherwise taxable accessions. However, as suggested ear-
lier, many of the aims of an accessions tax could be accommodated by
providing that the exemption increase with age, because accessions in ad-
75. Wealth acquired by one spouse by way of gratuitous transfer, especially among the
wealthy, is often not shared in practice, is typically not split on divorce, and is considered
separate property under community property law. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money,
and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J.
63, 75 n.37, 90 (1993).
76. If death is not on the horizon, the wealthier spouse would be unlikely to make gifts
that would result in the donee spouse becoming wealthier than the donor spouse.
77. This concept is familiar under the estate tax, see I.R.C. §§ 2035-2040 (2002), but it
would surely be necessary in this context to revive a "transfer within X years of death" rule




vanced age would not bear much on inequality of opportunity or disin-
centives to work. For example, if the initial exemption of a person is
$200,000, it might rise by gradual increments between ages 55-65, and
even greater increments thereafter, up to some maximum amount. In
practice, such a system would mostly benefit non-wealthy elderly surviv-
ing spouses.
Although Congress would certainly be capable of enacting an acces-
sions tax with a 100% marital exclusion, the problems raised by marriage
and its dissolution might perhaps somewhat slow the stampede of tax ex-
perts to embrace the idea of an accessions tax.
d. An Unlimited Income Tax Exclusion
Marriage would affect all income, not just gratuitous accessions. Gra-
tuitous receipts of a married person from third parties would be automat-
ically dealt with by the joint return (income-splitting) system. Inter-
spousal transfers during marriage would be ignored, as occurs under
§ 1041.
It might at first seem that the income-inclusion approach would be sub-
ject to the same conceptual and practical problems as an accessions tax
with respect to excluding estate transfers from the deceased spouse.78
However, the income tax is not really a wealth transfer tax, imposed with-
out regard to whether the wealth was previously subject to income or
transfer tax. Moreover, unused exemptions would not be an issue, or
raise tax-avoidance opportunities, under an income tax. In contrast, a
basic norm of the income tax is that income should not be taxed twice to
the same taxpayer. The income tax treats a married couple somewhat
like a partnership during the period where both spouses are alive, in the
sense that the joint return rate schedule produces the same tax result as if
aggregate taxable income were evenly split among married individuals
filing separately. But a married couple differs from a commercial part-
nership in two ways. One way is that transfers between married couples
are not treated as taxable sales and exchanges, whereas transfers between
commercial partners are. The second is that the death of a partner in a
commercial partnership causes a separate liquidation of each partner's
interest, whereas in a marriage it is considered normal for the deceased
marital partner's assets to be "continued by" (gratuitously transferred to)
the surviving spouse. To the extent that the decedent's assets pass to the
surviving spouse, the surviving spouse can be viewed as the sole equi-
tyholder in an entity that formerly had two equityholders. (In contrast,
other legatees of the decedent spouse cannot be viewed as being equi-
tyholders in the marital-asset equity prior to the first spouse's death.)
Under the "continuing entity" view of marital assets that end up in the
hands of the surviving spouse, the logic of the income tax dictates that
78. See also I.R.C. §§ 1(a), 2(a) (2002) (providing that a surviving spouse can file
under the joint return schedule for the two years following the year of the other spouse's
death).
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income taxed to the entity during life should not be taxed again to the
survivor after death. This approach is reinforced by the intuitive notion
that double income taxation of the same dollars to different taxpayers
should occur only when the two taxpayers are truly distinct in the tax
sense.
79
Even apart from the entity concept, it may simply be decided that
spousal estate transfers should be treated preferentially relative to trans-
fers to third parties, and preventing pre-death income from being taxed a
second time to the surviving spouse is the easiest and simplest way of
implementing such a preference. Also, an exclusion for inter-spousal es-
tate transfers would render irrelevant the possible distinction between
gift and estate transfers. Finally, it is inconceivable that any adoption by
Congress of an income-inclusion approach would lack a spousal
exclusion.
Of course, the exclusion would be limited to amounts existing at the
decedent spouse's death. Income arising subsequent to such death would
be taxed. The existing Subchapter J rules for trusts are adequate to carry
out the task of distinguishing between pre-death and post-death
income.80
3. The Marital Deduction (Or Exclusion) Qualification Rules
This time the various tax modes will be considered in a different order.
a. The Accessions Tax
Qualification for any marital exclusion would not be a problem under
an accessions tax, because accessions are deemed to occur when money
or property is actually received, as opposed to when interests in property
are initially acquired. For example, if H creates a trust, income and/or
corpus to W for life, remainder to C, then W would be treated as receiv-
ing an accession "from H" on account of each distribution of income and
corpus as and when it occurs. There would be no need for the "termina-
ble interest rule" as found under the estate and gift tax, which deals with
transfers subject to contingencies. Nor would it be necessary to assign a
value to "interests" acquired by gratuitous transfer.
79. Avoidance of double taxation within the "entity" occurs naturally under an acces-
sions tax with respect to self-acquired wealth (that is, wealth not subject to accessions tax
as it is acquired by marital unit). At worst, some such wealth may be taxed under the
accessions tax (a separate tax apart from the income tax) as it passes from the decedent
spouse to the surviving spouse, but any accessions tax on property transferred by the sur-
viving spouse would be payable by the legatees, meaning that any "second" accessions
taxation that occurs at this point would not be "on" the surviving spouse.
80. Pre-death income earned by the decedent spouse but not included in income prior
to death should either be accrued as income on his final income tax return or else be taxed
to the recipient under existing rules relating to "income in respect of a decedent." See




For this same reason, qualification would also not be a problem under
an income-inclusion approach. Nevertheless, a qualification rule may be
needed if inter-spousal transfers obtain a more favorable basis than other
gratuitous transfers. 8 1
c. Qualification Under an Estate or Inheritance Tax
Under the present estate and gift tax, the basic idea underlying qualifi-
cation is that deductibility is conditioned on certainty that the property
will appear in the transfer tax base of the transferee spouse (unless con-
sumed or wasted by her). This idea is carried out by the notorious "ter-
minable interest rule," which "tests" qualification solely by reference to
facts existing at the date of transfer and looking at worst-case scenarios,
somewhat like the Rule Against Perpetuities. Such an approach is neces-
sary, conceptually, in a transfer-oriented tax, since the possibility of a cur-
rent deduction cannot "wait-and-see" as to how future contingencies
actually play out.82
In any event, qualification (and inclusion in the transferee spouse's tax
base) will occur if the transfer to the spouse is outright83 or is in trust with
(a) an unrestricted general inter vivos or testamentary power of appoint-
ment in the transferee spouse (the "power-of-appointment trust," or
PAT),8 4 (b) a remainder in the transferee spouse's "estate" upon the
transferee spouse's death (the "estate trust"), 85 or (c) an election that the
property appear in the transferee spouse's tax base (the "OTIP trust"). 86
In the PAT and OTIP situations, but not the estate trust, there is the
further condition that the transferee spouse possess the right to all of the
income for life.87 In all of these situations, the entire transfer, not just the
actuarial value of the transferee spouse's interest, is deductible, and the
entire transfer is includable in the transferee spouse's tax base (unless
consumed or wasted).
These rules do not assure that the transferee spouse has anything re-
sembling full ownership. Qualification can be obtained by providing only
the minimum benefit of either an income interest for life (the QTIP trust)
or an "estate" remainder (the estate trust). An income interest isn't
worth much where the income yield is minimal and the spouse's life ex-
81. See I.R.C. § 1022(c) (2002).
82. This is not to say that the terminable interest rule cannot be simplified and/or
improved upon, but such a discussion is beyond the scope of this contribution.
83. An annuity qualifies if no payments can be made to a person other than the trans-
feree spouse.
84. See I.R.C. §§ 2056(b)(5) (estate tax), 2523(e) (gift tax) (2002).
85. The transferee spouse's estate is considered to be an attribute of the transferee
spouse herself. See I.R.C. §§ 2056(b)(1)(A), 2523(b)(1) (2002).
86. See I.R.C. §§ 2056(b)(7), 2523(f) (2002). A fourth possibility is the spousal re-
mainder trust, where the transferee spouse has a vested remainder following a life or term
interest in another party. Here the deductible amount is the actuarial value of the spousal
remainder interest.
87. See I.R.C. §§ 2056(b)(5), (7)(B)(ii)(I) (2002) (estate tax).
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pectancy is short.88 There is only a requirement that an income interest
be non-illusory. 89 Even combining these two features (as in a PAT with a
general testamentary power of appointment) falls short of complete own-
ership (the transferee spouse lacking current access to principal), unless
one assumes (wholly unrealistically) that a transferee spouse could bor-
row money in the entire amount of the trust principal and that her credi-
tors can be made to satisfy their claims only out of the trust assets
following the transferee spouse's death.
Where the transferee spouse does not possess complete ownership (or
its equivalent, such as an unrestricted general inter vivos power of ap-
pointment), the tax benefit arising from qualification inures in whole or
in part to the other beneficiaries of the trust. This is especially true of the
estate trust, where the transferee spouse may not possess any current en-
joyment rights at all.
It is obvious that these qualification rules are incompatible with the
only two theories plausibly justifying a marital deduction in the first
place, namely, the welfare theory and (especially) the estate-splitting the-
ory. Survivorship rights, by way of community property, jointly-held
property with rights of survivorship, and (except in a couple of states)
elective share rights, are rights to take property in fee simple absolute.
Since the transferee spouse is usually the wife, the qualification rules op-
erate to undermine women's property rights, and women (not just femi-
nists) should be outraged and indignant.
There are two possible solutions. One suggestion is to limit the marital
deduction to the actuarial value of interests transferred to the surviving
spouse. 90 However, this approach is seriously flawed, in my opinion.
This rule would change nothing with respect to PATs, which give the
transferee spouse only a testamentary power of appointment, and to es-
tate trusts, since in both cases all "interests" in the property pass to the
transferee spouse.91 The most misogynist qualification device, the estate
trust, would become widely used. As to the OTIP trust, the outcome
88. For a more detailed exposition of this point and its implications, see Joseph M.
Dodge, A Feminist Perspective on the QTIP Trust and the Unlimited Marital Deduction, 76
N.C. L. REV. 1729, 1741-43 (1998) [hereinafter Marital Deduction].
89. The standard is that the trust "give her that degree of beneficial ownership of the
trust property during her life which the principles of the law of trusts accord to a person
who is unqualifiedly designated as the life beneficiary of a trust." Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-
5(f)(1) (2002). The law of trusts requires impartiality between income beneficiaries and
remainders. Impartiality is normally satisfied by an income return of 3%, but anything
over 1% might pass muster, and a rate of return lower than 3% is quite possible if trust
investments underperform. The duty of impartiality is not self-executing, so that it is up to
the income beneficiary to initiate action against the trustee if there is an impartiality prob-
lem or a problem with investments.
90. The actuarial-value approach has been advanced in Howard E. Abrams, A Reeval-
uation of the Terminable Interest Rule, 39 TAX L. REV. 1, 23-25 (1983).
91. In a PAT trust, the general testamentary power of appointment would be treated
as the equivalent of a vested remainder, and any contingent interest of the takers in default
would be valued at zero. In an estate trust, accumulated income is added to corpus and
augments the remainder interest. The present value of the inception amount augmented
by all economic yield at any future date is equal to the inception amount.
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would hinge on accurate valuation of the spousal income interest. But
income interests are greatly overvalued under the actuarial tables. First,
the income yield is assumed to be 120% of the applicable midterm fed-
eral rate,92 which is likely to be significantly higher than the actual 2-5%
income yield of such trusts. Second, the discount rate is also set at 120%
of the applicable midterm federal rate. The higher the discount rate the
higher the valuation of income interests relative to remainder interests.
These problems might be fixable by requiring that an annuity or unitrust
interest (rather than an income interest) be given to the transferee
spouse, and the discount rate lowered to 100% of the applicable federal
rate. But that would still leave the problem of mortality. The argument
that deviations from mortality means would "average out" revenue-wise
is irrelevant from the equity point of view and is unrealistic in the aggre-
gate due to the problem of "adverse selection." Estate planners would
urge the use of QTIP-type trusts in cases where the transferee spouse is
expected to under-perform in terms of life expectancy, in which case the
deductible marital interest would be overvalued.
The second approach is, obviously, that the transferee spouse be given
an interest in fee simple absolute or its equivalent (meaning a single-life
annuity or a trust giving the surviving spouse an unrestricted inter vivos
general power of appointment). The surviving spouse can, with a lump
sum, purchase an annuity or self-settle a trust for her own benefit, if non-
tax considerations so warrant.
Two rationales have been offered for the QTIP option,93 but neither of
them withstands scrutiny. One is that reducing the spousal interest to a
QTIP interest was a fair trade-off for offering an unlimited marital deduc-
tion. But the entire trust qualifies for the deduction, not just the value of
the spousal income interest. As previously noted, the real value of the
spousal income interest in the entire estate may well be less than 50% of
the total value. And, the QTIP trust may well be "in" an amount less
than the decedent spouse's entire estate. Indeed, the ever-expanding es-
tate and gift tax exemption has provided a powerful incentive not to use
the maximum marital deduction, although that incentive could be neu-
tralized by allowing a deceased spouse's unused exemption to pass to the
surviving spouse (to the extent of qualifying marital-deduction transfers).
Taxes aside, the decedent may simply not wish to use an unlimited marital
deduction.
The second rationale was to allow wealthy (and presumably male) tes-
tators to exercise dead-hand control over the property after the surviving
spouse's death. This rationale flatly contradicts the estate-splitting (the
property was "theirs") norm, as it gives the decedent spouse the power to
control the ultimate disposition of the entire corpus. It may be argued
that the decedent spouse may wish to assure that transfers are made to
92. See I.R.C. § 7520(a)(2) (2002).
93. The history of the QTIP idea is described in Marital Deduction, supra note 88, at
1732-34.
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children of a prior marriage or other family members, but a reasonable
system does not in any way prevent transfers to such persons. Indeed, a
generous per-taxpayer exemption facilitates them wholly apart from a
marital deduction. A dual-transfer dispositive scheme of the estate-split-
ting variety may be optimal in this situation from both the tax and non-
tax angles.
It may be argued that, in a late-in-life marriage of short duration pro-
ducing no descendants, the estate-splitting norm simply should not apply.
This observation, however, suggests that the decedent should be able to
settle his marital obligations by devoting a fraction of his estate to the
purchase of a single-life annuity for the surviving spouse. Alternatively, it
suggests that a QTIP trust be tolerated only in situations of this type.
Moreover, the trust should be required to provide an annuity or unitrust
interest, and only the value of that interest should be deductible.
An argument against the position that qualification should (with the
exception noted) be limited to outright transfers or their equivalent is
that such a rule is not necessary due to community property and elective
share rules. But community property status only attaches to property ac-
quired during marriage. In a short-lived or late-in-life marriage, or where
the decedent acquired large amounts by gratuitous transfer, the percent-
age of the decedent spouse's gross estate constituted by interests in com-
munity property may be low. In common law states, the elective share
protection varies widely.94 Given the relatively low pay-off for electing
against an estate scheme containing a QTIP trust, a surviving spouse may
be quite reluctant to "stir up trouble" and "appear greedy" by doing so,
even if she is aware of her rights. Estate planners themselves do not view
elective share rights as a credible threat against the use of QTIP trusts.95
5. Summary of Inter-Spousal Transfers Discussion
The present estate and gift tax gets low marks for tolerating full qualifi-
cation of trust transfers on the basis of partial spousal interests. Although
that defect could be cured, something like the terminable interest rule
would need to be retained. An unlimited estate tax marital deduction can
be justified on pragmatic, if not conceptual, grounds.
Contrary to the view of its proponents, the concept of an accessions tax
does not allow for an unlimited marital exclusion. Also, it is not clear
how accessions by a married person from third parties should be handled.
94. Section 2-202(a) of the 1990 revision of the Uniform Probate Code renders the
elective share in common-law states a function of the length of the marriage. In addition,
the spouse's own assets count against the elective share. UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 2-206(b), 2-
209. At the other extreme, Georgia has no elective-share statute. In most states that do
have an elective share, the share is 30%, not 50%. In a small number of states, the elective
share can be satisfied by an income interest in a percentage of the estate. Depending on
state law, the elective estate may be "stripped" by various inter vivos transfers. WAG-
GONER ET AL., supra note 58, at 592-95, 600-22.
95. See Jeffrey N. Pennell, Minimizing the Surviving Spouse's Elective Share, 32 INST.
ON EsT. PLAN. 9-1 (1998) (claiming that most spouses would acquiesce in an estate-equali-
zation QTIP trust rather than elect against the will).
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Both problems can be accommodated under some kind of estate-equali-
zation scheme, but an estate-equalization scheme would raise both con-
ceptual and administrative problems of a very large order. At least
qualification would be much simplified, as a wait-and-see approach is ap-
propriate for an accessions tax.
The income-inclusion approach adopts the simplification aspects of
both systems: an unlimited marital exclusion implemented by the joint
return system and existing trust rules, combined with a simple wait-and-
see qualification approach.
B. DOES THE GENERATIONAL IDEA MAKE SENSE?
This section critically examines the notion that any tax on gratuitous
transfers should operate as a once-per-generation wealth tax. Contrary
to received wisdom, I conclude that a generation-skipping tax (GST) or
its equivalent is not warranted and, in any event, can only operate in a
fashion that is intolerably crude.
1. Can a Transfer Tax Function as a Proxy Wealth Tax?
It might be said that a transfer tax is best thought of as a wealth tax
imposed at periodic intervals.96 For this purpose a wealth tax is a tax on
the ability of a person to pay .(material wealth) on an annual (or other
periodic basis) regardless of how such wealth was acquired. An initial
observation is that the tax rate under an annual wealth tax would be set
to be significantly less than the most conservative and safe rate of re-
turn,97 whereas the rates under an estate tax, an inheritance tax, or an
income-inclusion system could bear only a random relationship to any
notion of an annualized rate of return.
A wealth tax is a tax on wealth acquired by any means, including labor,
investment, and entrepreneurial activity. 98 In contrast, the aim and effect
of any wealth transfer tax must be either to curb the transfer of whatever
wealth is left over after the consumption thereof (as in an estate tax) or to
curb the acquisition of a certain kind of (i.e., unearned) wealth acquired
by gratuitous receipt. 99 Any attempt to convert even a wealth transfer
tax into a periodic tax on inherited wealth would require that rates and
exemptions be keyed to the holding period of gratuitously-acquired assets
(and that would require a "tracing" convention), and the tax would have
96. An example is found in John T. Gaubatz, A Generation-Shifting Transfer Tax, 12
VA. TAX REV. 1 (1992).
97. Deborah H. Schenk, Saving the Income Tax with a Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV.
423, 442 (2000).
98. Two entire issues of Tax Law Review (Volume 53, Nos. 3 & 4) were devoted to a
wealth tax symposium. The lead article, Wealth Taxes, supra note 10, argues that a wealth
tax is incompatable with liberal values. The same author appears to hold the view that a
wealth transfer tax is not opposed to such values. Transferring Wealth, supra note 22.
99. Jantscher, supra note 6, at 46-48.
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to be designed so that it could not be avoided by consumption. 00
The GST is sometimes supported on the theory that it assures that
wealth is taxed periodically.' But a GST no more captures the aggre-
gate wealth of a transferor or transferee than does an estate, inheritance,
or accessions tax. It is more accurate to say that the aim of a GST is to
prevent the perceived avoidance of one of these wealth transfer taxes
through the creation of successive-interest transfers, 0 2 an aim that I will
shortly argue to be misguided. Of course, one might frankly advocate a
GST simply as a tax on trusts, but then one would have to justify the
proposition that wealth held in trust is uniquely deserving of a periodic
wealth tax. 10 3
The operation of a wealth transfer tax tied to the once-per-generation
idea can only be crude and inequitable. The first imposition of transfer
tax must be deferred until gift by, or the death of, the initial wealth ac-
quirer, which may be several decades after wealth is acquired by labor or
investment. Families that tend to produce children late in life can
lengthen the intervals at which any wealth transfer tax can be imposed.
There has never been any gift or estate tax exemption for gratuitous
transfers to persons simply for being in the same or higher generation,1 0 4
although there is such an exemption within the GST,10 5 but there a gener-
ation of beneficiaries may be terminated prematurely or delayed by rea-
son of longevity or fecundity. There is an estate tax credit'0 6 (provided by
§ 2013) with respect to property twice subject to estate tax within a short
interval, but the credit is phased out if the interval between deaths is
more than two years, and is not available against or on account of any gift
tax or GST.
Ironically, the only tax system that comprehensively reaches the wealth
of any individual is an income (or consumption) tax that does not exclude
gratuitous receipts.
100. A proposal for a wealth transfer tax that mimics an annual wealth tax is found in
Joseph M. Dodge, The Taxation of Wealth and Wealth Transfers: Where Do We Go After
ERTA?, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 738 (1982). See also Meade Report, supra note 41.
101. The GST (generation-skipping tax), found in Chapter 13 of the I.R.C. (§§ 2601 et
seq.), imposes a tax on generation-skipping transfers. The two paradigm generation-skip-
ping transfers are the "direct-skip" transfer (outright bequest to a grandchild) and the
"taxable termination" (as occurs in a trust created by parent A, income to child B for life,
remainder to grandchild C, upon the death of child B). See I.R.C. §§ 2611-2613 (2002).
The GST is in addition to any estate or gift tax on the transfer. The definition of genera-
tion-skipping transfer is keyed to generations under I.R.C. §§ 2613, 2651 (2002).
102. Rationales for a GST are discussed in Joseph M. Dodge, Substantial Ownership
and Substance versus Form: Proposals for the Unification of Federal Estate and Gift Taxes
and for the Taxation of Generation-Skipping Transfers, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 657, 662-70 (1976)
[hereinafter Substantial Ownership].
103. Such a tax would arguably be an unapportioned direct tax, see supra note 24, but it
might be defended as a reasonable proxy for a wealth transfer tax.
104. The marital deduction rests on independent grounds. The surviving spouse may
clearly occupy a lower generation than the transferor spouse.
105. See supra note 43.
106. See I.R.C. § 2013 (2002).
2003]
SMU LAW REVIEW
2. Does the GST Further a Relevant Concept of Equity?
The only plausible normative basis for the GST within a wealth transfer
tax system is that of transferee "equity." The problem is typically illus-
trated by positing a set of individuals that we can call A, B, and C.
Wealth is taxed twice as it is transferred from A to B and then from B to
C, and the double tax can be avoided if A transfers the property directly
to C, by-passing B. An alternative technique is a trust created by A, in-
come to B for life, remainder to C, as the death of B generates neither
estate nor gift tax. The inequity in the situation is said to reside in the
fact that, assuming no GST and a given wealth amount in the hands of the
initial transferor (A), the terminal transferee (C) will end up with more
wealth after tax if received directly from A than if the same wealth passed
from A to B and then from B to C. The GST was originally enacted in
1976 precisely to "correct" this situation by imposing a tax on the trust by
reason of B's death. But the current GST,10 7 enacted in 1986, goes so far
as to impose a "second" tax, in addition to the estate and gift tax, on a
direct (non-trust) gift or estate transfer directly from A to C.
Note that the equity issue is wholly independent of what generations
are occupied by A, B, and C respectively. Note also that the hypothetical
is artificial in that, in real life, it cannot be simply assumed that any
amount received by C from B is the same property that B received from
A. If it is assumed that B "first" consumed amounts received from A and
that whatever B bequeathed to C came out of new wealth amassed by B,
the whole equity problem dissolves.
Even if one takes the hypothetical at face value, it turns out that the
perceived equity problem does not really exist. The concept of equity
("fairness") can only relate to individuals, not things. Nor can it properly
be made to apply to "lineages," 10 8 first, because there really are no such
things as separate and distinct lineages, 10 9 and second, because there is no
apparent normative basis for analyzing equity claims in terms of lineages
rather than individuals.1 0 The assertion that the problem involves equity
among lineages is simply a way of framing the issue in a way that foreor-
dains the conclusion.
To say that group A, B, and C may arrange their affairs to suffer tax
less often than group X, Y, and Z is merely descriptive. This fact alone
does not point to any inequity, unless group X, Y, and Z is unfairly con-
strained relative to group A, B, and C. But any difference in the fre-
107. I.R.C. §§ 2601-2664 (2002).
108. Economists invoke the notion of lineages and extended families in an attempt to
explain bequest behavior. Douglas Holtz-Eakin, The Uneasy Empirical Case for Abolish-
ing the Estate Tax, 51 TAx L. REV. 495, 505 (1996). This use of the lineages concept is
divorced from equity analysis.
109. With the abolition of primogeniture, any given individual has multiple ancestors
who count equally at each generation, and those ancestors have multiple descendants.
110. The general claim (in itself controversial) that families are the basic unit of society
only applies to families as they exist at the relevant historical moment, because it is "in the
moment" families that possess authority and welfare functions apart from society or the
state.
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quency of transfer tax within any group of the same size is a matter of
free choice. 11' There is no legal constraint on any set of individuals to
suffer transfer tax more frequently than other sets of individuals. It may
be argued that only the very wealthy are financially able to effect trans-
fers that can "skip" transfer tax. But there is no significant constraint
upon even modest wealth being transferred in a successive-interest
mode. 112
If there is no external constraint on the making of successive-interest
transfers, it becomes relevant to examine motivations. That is, does the
tax system itself operate as a constraint, or are successive-interest trans-
fers typically created for other reasons? The effect of a split-interest
transfer is to (possibly) preserve (or augment) the principal after a period
of enjoyment by current beneficiaries and to direct the disposition of such
principal. This effect is compatible with motivations of the following
types: (1) the desire to exert dead-hand control for its own sake, (2) the
desire to create a lasting monument to the settlor, (3) the wish to protect
beneficiaries from their own improvidence or incapacity, (4) the desire to
keep wealth "within the family," and (5) the wish to provide for second-
look flexibility through the exercise of discretionary powers and powers
of appointment. These non-tax wishes and purposes are obviously inter-
related, and they all converge in the notion of the successive-interest
transfer, preferably in the form of a trust. The concept of a successive-
interest transfer makes sense only where it is contemplated that the initial
beneficiaries do not, might not, or should not "need" access to principal.
It would be considered perverse to deprive one's needy children of eco-
nomic resources simply so that more remote descendants might obtain a
free head start on life. Any kind of successive-interest transfer is likely to
be viewed as being far superior (apart from tax) over the next-best eco-
nomic alternative, which is the making of various lump sum bequests to
various beneficiaries in varying degrees of relationship that can (but don't
have to) be invested in annuities or life insurance policies so as to mimic
current-enjoyment and remainder interests.
Statistically, the propensity to think in terms of split-interest transfers is
likely to be more common as wealth increases, since the greater the
wealth the easier it is to provide for both current and successive benefi-
ciaries at the same time, but that fact does not establish the proposition
that generation-skipping trusts are (or ever were) tax motivated. This
point effectively counters the "neutrality" version of the equity argument,
111. The intervals between taxes are a function of longevity, which in itself is not much
a matter of choice. However, the constituent group can be freely selected with expected
longevity in mind. For example, it would be dumb to leave a large bequest in fee simple
(instead of an annuity) to an ancestor or sibling. In any event, the equity argument is
posited in terms of frequency, not intervals.
112. Although financial institutions may not accept small trusts, a settlor can name a
relative or friend as trustee, and once established a trust will not fail for want of a trustee.
Numerous non-trust alternatives are available: legal life estates followed by remainders,




which is that a GST is necessary to counter-act the "tax" inducement to
make generation-skipping transfers.' 1 3 If the principal motivations for
creating successive-interest transfers have nothing to do with tax, then
there is no reason to create a tax disincentive for such transfers.1 14 In-
deed, it then becomes the case that the imposition of additional taxes on
generation-skipping transfers is what violates neutrality. This non-neu-
trality is blatant in the case of the existing GST on direct-skip transfers
(such as outright bequests to grandchildren).
Any equity argument not founded on the notion of unfair constraint
must be founded on some notion of (equal) entitlement. Thus, in the A,
B, C group hypothesized above, the question is whether C is "entitled" to
the same after-tax amount originating with A regardless of whether: (1) A
transferred the property outright to B, and B subsequently transferred it
outright to C; (2) A transferred the property in trust, income to B for life,
remainder to C; or (3) A transferred the property directly (and outright)
to C. One observing that equity claims cut two ways would argue that the
norm is the direct transfer from A to C, with the consequence that the
transfer tax should either exempt the transfer from A to B or the transfer
(or, in the case of the trust, the shifting of enjoyment) from B to C, as
opposed to imposing an additional tax on the direct transfer from A to C.
Indeed, the equity-of-succession argument is really an argument for no
transfer taxation whatsoever, because only in a no-tax environment can
such a norm be achieved. In any event, on the merits C is entitled to
nothing at all. It is axiomatic in the United States that A and B are free
to consume the property or give it to charity. Certainly A is free to
choose to allow B to enjoy the property prior to allowing C to enjoy it.
A third possible approach to equity analysis is simply that likes should
be treated alike, but this approach depends upon establishing that non-
identical situations in fact are "really" the "same." The situation where A
transfers wealth to B who in turn transfers it to C is fundamentally dis-
similar from both the outright transfer from A to C and the trust transfer
by A, income to B for life, remainder to C. The outright transfer from A
to C gives nothing at all to B. On what basis can it be claimed that B
"really" acquired the property from A and passed it on, in turn, to C? In
the trust situation, what B receives is an income interest, but an income
interest is considerably less than a fee interest, because the holder of the
income interest cannot consume, appropriate, or dispose of the corpus.
And, of course, the actual income received does augment the transfer tax
base of the holder of the income interest. Thus, the three situations are
not remotely identical.
113. See, e.g., Halbach, supra note 11, at 225-29, 241.-42 (arguing for additional acces-
sions tax on generation-skipping transfers to counter tax inducement to make such
transfers).
114. A tax on trusts might be plausible if it were concluded that trusts (or long-term
trusts) are per se bad as a matter of policy, but that issue is beyond the scope of this
contribution.
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In general, tax rules are (and should be) tailored to what actually hap-
pens, not what might have happened under the highest-tax scenario. But
the whole basis of the GST is to tax property somewhat "as if" property
had passed in fee simple through each successive generation. Basically,
an estate or inheritance tax should be imposed on wealth the transferor
actually owned (or constructively owned), and not property he would
have (or might have) owned if the worst possible transfer tax planning
advice had been carried out. Similarly, under an accessions or income
tax, the tax base should be keyed to what is received. Under an acces-
sions tax (or income-inclusion rule), the prior tax history of the property
(if any) in the hands of other persons is irrelevant, just as the identity of
the transferor is irrelevant. What is important is what the transferee re-
ceives, not how it got there.
Stating the same point from the "neutrality" angle, a person in A's po-
sition may be aware that that C will end up with more of the property
after tax, in the absence of a GST, under a dispositive plan that either
skips B completely or gives B only an income interest. But following
either course of action is hardly a trivial matter even to a person con-
cerned only about how he or she will be remembered (and who is indif-
ferent to the welfare of B). Especially if a concern for B's welfare is
factored in, it seems unlikely that the dispositive plan will be driven by
tax considerations. Indeed, imposing a GST only in the trust situation is
likely to discourage the trust alternative, and imposing a GST on both the
trust and direct-transfer alternatives is likely to discourage the direct-
transfer alternative. Neutrality is, at best, a slippery concept in the pre-
sent context.
3. Is It Possible to Correctly Design a GST?
Even allowing for "inequities" resulting from differences in genera-
tional spacing, it is not clear that it is possible to accurately design a GST
that is based on the idea of what a person in a skipped-generation would
have received if he or she had received the property outright prior to
passing it on to the ultimate transferees. Any such system has to be based
on speculation, such as that an income beneficiary would have received a
fee-simple bequest. But a trust transfer may not have any fixed-interest
income beneficiaries, or even any intermediate-generation beneficiaries.
The 1976 GST generally assumed that the skipped person was the parent
(descended from the original transferor) who was one of the parents of
the highest-generation transferee below the transferor. Of course, there
may have been perfectly good reasons why the transferor would not have
bequeathed amounts outright to such parent. Also, since the parent (if
he or she had received an outright bequest from the transferor) could
have split transfers with his or her spouse, it seems more reasonable that
both parents should have been treated as skipped persons. But then




The 1976 GST attributed amounts to the skipped persons (the
"deemed transferors") and the amounts so attributed were treated as gift
or estate transfers of the deemed transferors under the gift and estate
tax.1 5 Various problems with the 1976 approach, especially the deemed-
transferor concept, 1" 6 led to its retroactive repeal and replacement in
1986 by the current "simplified" GST, which: (1) dropped the deemed-
transferor concept, (2) added direct-skip transfers to the list of taxable
transfers, (3) separated the GST from the estate and gift tax, (4) adopted
a flat rate, and (5) keyed the exemption amount ($1 million, as indexed)
to the original transferor. 117 All of these moves (except arguably the in-
clusion of direct-skip transfers) constituted a retreat from any pretence to
accuracy (and, hence, equity and neutrality).
Particularly unfortunate, in my opinion, was the separate per-trans-
feror exemption apart from (and in addition to) estate and gift tax life-
time exemptions. To illustrate, assume that both the GST exemption and
the estate and gift tax exemption are $1 million per person. D bequeaths
$1 million to a trust, income to E for life, remainder to F. This trust
avoids estate tax on D's death and GST on E's death, but without using
up any of E's own gift and estate tax exemption at E's generation. This
result is harmless if E has no separate estate, but to the extent that E does
amass a separate estate the next generation (that of F) in effect obtains
the benefit of a double estate tax exemption. This system actually invites
the creation of generation-skipping transfers but also complicates disposi-
tive schemes by creating an inducement to limit such transfers to $1 mil-
lion per transferor.
Another problematic feature of the exemption is that it "attaches" to
the trust at the date of initial transfer and expands at the same rate as the
trust expands. Thus, in the example just stated where D creates a trust
worth $1 million, there is no tax on E's death even if the trust is then
worth $5 million.'' 8 The rationale of this rule appears to be precisely to
"neutralize" the effect of future appreciation relative to a fixed-dollar ex-
emption. 19 But the logic of such an approach would dictate similar treat-
ment for non-trust transfers. Thus, assuming an exemption of $1 million,
a bequest by A of $1 million to B would not only be exempt from tax but
the latter transfer by B to C of the same property (now grown to $5 mil-
lion) would also be wholly free of tax, and so on to infinity. But the con-
115. Professor Halbach's accessions tax proposal has a similar feature, except that un-
used exemptions of skipped persons can be used to offset any generation-skipping acces-
sion. Halbach, supra note 11, at 242-48, 253-62. But identifying "skipped persons" in this
context is as problematic as identifying "deemed transferors" under the 1976 GST.
116. See Joseph M. Dodge, Generation-Skipping Transfers After the Tax Reform Act of
1976, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1265 (1977). The 1986 legislative history states that the 1976 GST
was "unduly complicated." See H.R. REP. No. 99-426, at 824 (1985).
117. Husband and wife are separate transferors. Thus, a married couple can effect tax-
free generation-skipping transfers aggregating $2 million at date-of-transfer values.
118. In effect, there is an exclusion ratio of 100%, which adheres to the trust for its
entire duration. I.R.C. § 2642(a)(1), (2) (2002).
119. See Halbach, supra note 11, at 217.
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cept of a transfer tax does not allow for prepayments, particularly
prepayments that can exempt a succession of gratuitous transfers involving
the same wealth. The tax base and exemptions should be determined at
the time of each and every taxable event, letting the chips fall where they
may. Otherwise, the whole system would collapse. 120
For basically the same reason, imposing the GST on an outright trans-
fer to a grandchild is problematic due to the timing issue. That is, assum-
ing that the aim of taxing direct-skip transfers is to produce a result
equivalent to the successive bequest (or trust) situation, 2 1 the GST tax
base for the direct-skip transfer is over-stated. 122
4. Can a Wealth Transfer Tax Be Imposed Too Often?
Accepting the notion that the once-per-generation idea (and the GST)
is misconceived and/or unworkable, it may still be thought that a person
who dies shortly after receiving a gratuitous transfer never really
"owned" or "acquired" the property to the degree that is sufficient to tax
him or her on it. But (unlike the concept of an annual wealth tax) the
concept of a tax on gratuitous transfers or accessions, strictly speaking,
does not factor in the period for which the wealth was held.1 23 Under the
accessions tax or income-inclusion approaches, holding period and use
are both irrelevant.
Thus, I do not really view holding period as a problem. But a better
way of dealing with it (that does not involve the complications of present
§ 2013) would be to ignore an estate transfer that occurs within (say) two
years of another estate transfer. Under the estate tax, such a system
120. Taken to its logical conclusion, a person could declare his wealth to be "taxable" at
the moment her wealth equals the exemption level, so that subsequent growth in the same
wealth would escape tax not only at such person's death but also for so long as the same
property passed intact by gratuitous transfer. The whole point of anti-estate-freeze provi-
sions, such as I.R.C. §§ 2701, 2702, is to counter moves of this sort.
121. The contention that, in the name of "neutrality," the tax should be the same as if A
made a bequest to child B who immediately made a gift of the net proceeds to C (which is
the result obtained under the current GST) should be rejected, as B never received any-
thing, and a rational person in A's position would never arrange a twice-taxed transaction
along these lines.
122. The GST is a kind of proxy tax for the estate tax that would have been paid on the
same property after one generation under certain assumptions. But this proxy tax is im-
posed in advance on the full value of the property. At the time the GST is imposed, the
value of the property (using standard financial analysis of the type incorporated into the
actuarial tables used for estate and gift tax purposes) is the sum of (a) the present value of
the income stream (economic yield) for a period equal to, say, 25 years and (b) the present
value of the principal at the end of the same period, which is assumed to be unchanged.
Thus, if property worth $1 million is bequeathed outright to the decedent's grandchild, the
present value of an income interest for 25 years might be worth $650,000 and that of the
corpus interest would be $350,000. The GST is in fact imposed on the $1 million, but it
should be imposed (if at all) on only $350,000, the present value of the corpus interest that
"would be" subject to estate tax after 30 years. It is true that direct-skip transfers obtain an
implicit deduction for the GST itself (payable by the transferor or her estate), § 2623,
whereas other types of generation-skipping transfers do not. Thus, in the illustration used
in this footnote, if the applicable rate is 50%, the GST tax base is really $666,667, and the
GST $333,333. But the ex ante tax is still excessive by a significant margin.
123. See supra note 100.
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would operate by treating the death of legatee B within two years of re-
ceiving a gift or bequest from A as a per se qualified disclaimer on B's
part, resulting in an exclusion from B's estate of an amount equal to the
gift or bequest from A.12 4 Under an accessions tax or an income tax, the
initial receipt (by B from A) would be retroactively treated as a non-
accession or as non-income.
Another possible approach would be to exempt "upwards" and lateral
transfers from tax, but such a rule would more radically alter the purpose
and effect of the tax.125
C. ARE GiFr EXCLUSIONS WARRANTED?
Under any system the function of any gift exclusion should be to
render unimportant the distinction between excludable "support" 126 and
taxable transfer (or receipt) and to distinguish between a donor's con-
sumption spending that benefits others from true wealth transfers (gifts
of cash, investments, businesses, and non-wasting assets, plus transactions
that reduce liabilities). Trust transfers and transfers of business and in-
vestment property would never be excluded. 127
Under an income-inclusion scheme the rationale for a consumption ex-
clusion would run deeper than administrative convenience. The income
tax has always taxed consumption assets "only once," by disallowing a
deduction for the cost of a consumption asset (or a consumption ex-
pense), whereas investment yield is "taxed twice" (by disallowing a de-
duction for the purchase price of the asset and including the yield in gross
income). 2 8 A corollary of this approach is that the purchase of a con-
sumption asset (or the making of a consumption expense) by one party for
the benefit of another is taxed entirely to the first party. It is true that
under present law, in-kind consumption is included in income in cases
where the relationship between the parties is such that (1) the consump-
tion received can plausibly be viewed as the receipt of cash wealth fol-
lowed by a free spending choice and (2) not taxing the consumption
would have the potential to systematically undermine the tax system (for
124. There could be an election out of this rule in a case where B is A's surviving
spouse. Also, in order to prevent excludable amounts from producing estate tax deduc-
tions, there would need to be some rule (such as "first out of the residue") to determine
who is deemed to take from A the excluded amount.
125. See Halbach, supra note 11, at 234.
126. The IRS has never attempted to include in-kind support in the recipient's gross
income. Cash support was excluded in the early case of Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151
(1917), in an opinion devoid of convincing justification other than the implicit assumption
that such support could only be taxed once across the transferor-transferee pair. This as-
sumption was codified by the enactment in 1942 of the predecessors of §§ 71, 215.
127. Commentators have offered various schemes, but there seems to be widespread
agreement on the general approach. See authorities cited in Consumption Tax, supra note
7, at 587 n.234. See also Halbach, supra note 11, at 235-36.
128. The cost of an asset is the present value of future returns. In the case of a con-
sumption asset, the future returns take the form of satisfactions known as imputed income
and objectively measured by the rental value of the asset.
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example, by disguising compensation or dividends). 129 In the present
context, the ongoing relationship is present, and there is a danger that
transfers of wealth could be cloaked as in-kind consumption, but a con-
sumption exclusion would pose little danger of concealing wage, business,
or investment income. Since consumption assets usually decline in value,
a strategy of buying expensive consumer assets prior to then transferring
them to relatives would entail economic waste. Another consideration is
that transfers resulting from separation and divorce and payments of
child support would probably continue to be treated under a "single tax"
mode. 130 Finally, it would be very difficult for the system to detect con-
sumption expenses and gifts of small-time consumer assets. Therefore,
the best income tax approach would be to adhere to the same notion of a
consumption exclusion as would operate in any of the transfer taxes.
Consideration should be given to extending the consumption-asset exclu-
sion to bequests.
The integrity of the concept of "consumption asset" would need to be
maintained by anti-abuse rules. The consumption-asset category would
exclude collectibles and other assets of the type that would not be depre-
ciable if held for investment. Personal residences would be on the bor-
derline. There might be a more generous dollar "cap" on such residences
compared to caps on other borderline assets, such as expensive motor
vehicles. Under the income-inclusion system, an additional weapon is
available; any excluded consumer asset would obtain a zero basis, and
any sale or rental of a zero-basis asset would constitute a deemed realiza-
tion event. The same principle could be adapted to an accessions tax in
the form of a delayed-accession rule.
Given a consumption exclusion, there would be little reason to provide
annual (or lifetime) dollar exclusions for taxable gifts, except possibly to
remove trivia from the system that would be hard to enforce in any event.
On the other hand, a possible rationale of excluding small cash gifts on an
annual basis is that these gifts can usually be viewed as indirect gifts of in-
kind consumption.
The categorical and unlimited exemption for bona fide consumption
transfers should improve the acceptability of an accessions tax or income-
inclusion system to the middle class.
D. THE TIMING OF TRANSFERS AND RECEIPTS
There are complex and separate sets of rules under the present estate
tax, gift tax, and income tax for determining when an inter vivos transfer,
subject to one or more retained interests and powers, is "complete."
129. JOSEPH M. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE, AND
POLICY: TEXT, CASES, PROBLEMS ch. 4 (2d ed. 1999) (distinguishing between employee
fringe benefits, on the one hand, and consumption benefits obtained through promotional
and recruitment activities of business, on the other).




These rules operate somewhat like a Richard Strauss tone poem: basically
tonal but discordant, with frequent modulations, yet always lush and
complex. A gift tax must decide the issue of completeness ex ante, and an
estate tax cannot defer taxability beyond death. An accessions or income
tax can be patient, and wait beyond transfer to actual receipt.
1. Hybrid Transfers Under the Estate (or Inheritance) and Gift Tax
The estate and gift tax rules are overly reliant on property law concepts
of "interests." Interests under the estate and gift tax require actuarial
valuation,' 31 but estate planners can turn actuarial tables to their advan-
tage. The present system encourages devices (such as GRATs, private
annuities, and sales of remainder interests) that would never (or hardly
ever) be undertaken except to take advantage of current doctrine con-
cerning "hybrid transfers" (inter vivos transfers with retained interests
and powers). Since I have previously written about this topic in consider-
able detail,' 32 I shall only summarize my recommendations here.
Basically, an inter vivos transfer should be treated as being incomplete
for so long as there is any (more than a de minimis) possibility that pos-
session or enjoyment or amounts (whether from income or corpus) may
be distributed, or might revert, to the transferor or the transferor's estate.
Such a possibility need only be inherent in the form of the transfer. Al-
ternatively, any arrangement connected with the transfer (other than an
installment sale of the entire property for a fixed dollar amount that is
secured by the transferred property) under which future payments will
(or may be) made to the transferor should trigger the incompleteness
rule. A transfer of this type would be complete when (and to the extent
that) the property (including net economic yield therefrom) ceases to be
subject to the possibility of enjoyment by the transferor, but no later than
the transferor's death. Any consideration received for such a transfer
would, at best, reduce the amount included in the tax base dollar for dol-
lar. There would be an exception for commercial transactions (but not
private annuities, etc., entered into with family members).
The hard-to-complete rule described above serves three functions.
First, it precludes the double taxation of the same amounts to the same
taxpayer that would occur if the initial transfer were deemed complete
and subsequently amounts derived from that transfer "came back" to the
transferor. Second, it avoids inaccurate valuations (under actuarial ta-
bles) of transfers of current-enjoyment or remainder interests. Third (but
related to the second), it forecloses tax avoidance through the making of
"sales" (for full and adequate consideration) of partial interests to related
parties, while still allowing the consideration received to offset the
amount included in the tax base.
131. See I.R.C. § 7520(a) (2002).
132. Joseph M. Dodge, Redoing the Estate and Gift Taxes Along Easy-To-Value Lines,
43 TAX L. REv. 241, 264-316 (1988) [hereinafter Redoing].
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On the other hand, transfers with retained powers (and not otherwise
within the incompleteness rule just described, such as retained powers to
revoke or cause distributions to be made to the grantor) would always be
treated as complete upon transfer. The notion of retained control may
possess some necessary relevance for income tax purposes, 133 but not for
transfer tax purposes. Moreover, current rules pertaining to retained
control have been emasculated by judicial decision, and the task of draft-
ing a statute that would effectively distinguish between "benign" and
"meaningful" powers would be overwhelmingly difficult. 134
Employee survivor benefits would always be included in the tax base of
the deceased employee at death, whether or not the deceased retained
any interest or power, and regardless of any earlier assignments (which
would be ignored for gift tax purposes)., 35
Joint tenancies with right of survivorship should be treated as provided
under current § 2040, except that the creation of the tenancy by one party
should be treated as an incomplete transfer due to his or her retained
interests. 136
2. Delayed Accessions Under an Accessions Tax
The basic problem under an accessions tax has to do with the issue of
when an accession taking the form of a present or future interest (in trust
or otherwise) is deemed received. This problem extends beyond the
death of the transferor. Under an accessions tax, actuarial valuation can
be systematically avoided. 137 Inclusion would await the time when actual
economic benefits are received (the ex post approach), 138 because accu-
rate valuation is thereby achieved. This principle also avoids problems
with contingent interests or interests subject to forfeiture conditions.
Both income distributions and corpus distributions would be treated as
accessions.139
Although it may be tempting to adopt the ex ante approach (or elec-
tion) for situations where such valuation is reasonably reliable, the temp-
tation should be resisted, since different valuation rules for different
types of interests would violate ne utrality. 140 About the only situation
where an ex ante approach may be warranted is an annuity for a term of
133. Control is the key to assignment-of-income doctrine. Kornhauser, supra note 5, at
53.
134. See Redoing, supra note 132, at 309-13.
135. Id. at 318-20.
136. Id. at 316-17.
137. The wait-and-see approach avoids problems with split-interest charitable transfers,
as well. Accessions by charities are ignored under either an accessions tax or an income
tax. Under the estate and gift tax, charitable interests must be valued ex ante, and complex
rules exist in §§ 664, 2055, and 2522 to prevent manipulation of valuation.
138. Andrews, supra note 11, at 591-92; Halbach, supra note 11, at 221-23.
139. The gratuitous transfer is a transfer of both income and corpus, neither of which is
taxed until distribution. Trust income would continue to be subject to income tax accord-
ing to Subchapter J.
140. Andrews, supra note 11, at 597-602.
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years (and other term-certain fixed-payment obligations, but excluding
unmatured life insurance policies, which have not yet matured).
Ex ante treatment could be adopted for life or term interests in tangible
property not held in trust. 141 The alternative would be to "deem" distri-
butions equal to the fair rental value of the property.142
Is there any downside to deferral? Although taxable events may be
deferred, the aggregate tax base would grow assuming any positive eco-
nomic return. In aggregate tax-base terms (and assuming no exemp-
tions), the value of a sum in hand that can be invested equals the present
value of all future returns from such sum. Assuming a flat rate and no
exemptions (and a risk-free investment return), any tax collectible now
would equal, in present value terms, the taxes collected later. Since the
revenue collected by an accessions tax would be relatively inconsequen-
tial in budgetary or economic terms, the deferral of collection is equally
inconsequential from the government's point of view. Assuming that the
population increases somewhat, the government might lose slightly by the
aggregate increase in the number of lifetime exemptions, but this is likely
to be outweighed by an increase in aggregate amounts over current
exemptions. 143
Taxpayers would generally prefer to avoid deferral in a climate of
fixed-amount exemptions (and progressive rates) because the larger ag-
gregate tax base attributable to a given transferor will be subject to
higher tax rates with the passage of time. Of course, this problem would
vanish if the accessions tax were imposed at a progressive rate without
any lifetime exemption. But assuming either or both the existence of ex-
emptions or flat rates, there would appear to be a disincentive to create
long-term trusts. However, such a dis-incentive would not necessarily be
a bad thing, for two reasons. First, non-tax legal constraints on the dura-
tion of trusts are weakening.144 Second, it is hard to justify dead-hand
control, if it can be justified at all, beyond the horizon of persons known
to a transferor. 145 Even if a slight tax disadvantage might attend deferral,
it cannot be said with any confidence that decisions concerning the crea-
tion of trusts will be affected much by it, especially since the tax disadvan-
tage will occur in the (perhaps distant) future and upon taxpayers other
than the transferor. Finally, the possible taxpayer remedies that have
141. See Halbach, supra note 11, at 261-62.
142. Andrews, supra note 11, at 595, 604-05.
143. The ALI Proposal described in Andrews, supra note 11, at 595-97, views deferral
as a possible problem for the government and suggests it be remedied by imposing an up-
front tax on large trusts that operates as a withholding tax, i.e., that is creditable against
transferee taxes on grossed-up distributions from the trust. Such a system would operate
most smoothly if the ex-ante tax were imposed at a flat rate with no exemptions.
144. JOHN C. CRIBBET & CORWIN W. JOHNSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY
114 (3d ed. 1989); Joel C. Dobris, The Death of the Rule Against Perpetuities, or the RAP
Has No Friends-An Essay, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TRUST J. 601 (2000).
145. See Adam Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand,
68 IND. L. REV. 1, 14-18 (1992) (acknowledging the point but not necessarily reaching the
same conclusion).
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been advanced to cure the so-called "deferral penalty" are misconceived
and would add unneeded complexity. These possible remedies are (1) a
tax prepayment option 146 and (2) a rate-freezing option.147 But it has to
be emphasized that deferral under an accessions tax is not a mere rule of
convenience that deviates from the norm of a tax being imposed on a
transfer. Rather, the deferral of the taxable event until receipt is the acces-
sions tax principle itself.
It should be noted that any beneficiary holding a saleable trust interest
(or legal present or future interest) could accelerate the taxable event by
selling the interest.148 This possibility might suggest the tax-avoidance
device of selling alienable, but highly-contingent, interests to related par-
ties in an effort to accelerate the taxable event. Another problem raised
by sales to related parties is that, ordinarily, a purchaser of any such inter-
est for full and adequate consideration in money or money's worth would
be an investor, so that actual receipts would not be treated as accessions.
The only realistic way of closing this potential loophole would be a rule
that essentially disregarded any such related-party sale, on the theory that
such a transaction would not be undertaken without a tax avoidance pur-
pose. Moreover, such a de facto prohibition would not interfere with any
legitimate market. Assuming the sale is not between spouses, the
purchase price would be treated as an accession by the seller, and the
purchaser could offset subsequent accessions by an amount equal to the
purchase price.149
In sum, under an accessions tax, deferral of the taxable event would be
"the rule," but this feature may weaken its appeal among those favoring
the meaningful taxation of gratuitous transfers, even though deferral will
typically be accompanied by the dispersion of wealth among multiple
beneficiaries.
3. Delayed Transfers Under an Income Tax
Similar considerations as apply to an accessions tax apply to an income-
inclusion system with regard to present and future interests, in trust or
otherwise, but there are three principal differences.
One difference is that, unlike an accessions tax, current income cannot
be relegated to limbo until distributed but must (or at least can) be attrib-
uted to some taxpayer on a current basis. The existing system recognizes
this point by treating the trust as a separate taxable entity. Basically, the
trust is treated as the taxpayer of last resort to whom income is attributed
on a current basis when it cannot appropriately be taxed to the transferor
146. Andrews, supra note 11, at 602-03. This option would only make sense for certain
trusts and under certain assumptions relating to the rate structure, so that it does not com-
prehensively "solve" any perceived neutrality problem.
147. See Halbach, supra note 11, at 253-60 (an exemption-leveraging solution), which is
critiqued supra text accompanying note 120.
148. Andrews, supra note 11, at 603.
149. Such a rule would, however, require monitoring, as it would allow tax base shifting
between related parties (other than spouses).
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during life or to a beneficiary in actual or constructive receipt of the
income. 150
Second, during a trust grantor's lifetime the policy of protecting the
progressive rate system may cut in favor of taxing the grantor on trust
income not actually received by the grantor. This task is presently per-
formed by the grantor trust rules of §§ 671-77. I have argued elsewhere
that the income (and gains) of an inter vivos trust should always be taxed
to the grantor while alive, regardless of retained interests and powers. 151
If this option is not followed, I would prefer a reform of the grantor trust
rules in the direction of simplification according to two basic principles.
First, the grantor should be taxed on the income and gains of a trust if
there is any (non de minimis) possibility that the income and/or corpus
can (directly or indirectly, and by whatever means) revert to the grantor
or grantor's spouse (or the estate of either of them). 52 As to retained-
power transfers, § 674 is too complex. 53 The rule should be that the
grantor should be taxed if the grantor or the grantor's spouse, alone or in
conjunction with others, and without regard to the existence or non-exis-
tence of standards, can alter the beneficial enjoyment of income and/or
corpus.
Second, the basic norm of income taxation is that investments are "af-
ter tax."'154 Moreover, under an income-inclusion scheme (as opposed to
an accessions tax), the trust, as a separate taxpayer, can plausibly operate
as the "stand-in investor" representing the various beneficiaries and their
interests, as essentially occurs under present law, because under the in-
come-inclusion approach there would be no per-transferee exemptions
for which a trust-level proxy would need to be constructed.
These points would play out as follows with respect to trusts. First,
completed transfers into trust (whether in cash or in kind) would be
treated as fully included in the income of the trust (possibly subject to a
flat rate or some special rate schedule), just as an outright gift or bequest
would be treated as gross income in full to any legatee. This tax, which
would not be treated as a creditable withholding tax pending future distri-
butions, would be implicitly borne by all beneficiaries in proportion to
their interests. 155 Second, such inclusion would give the trust an incep-
150. See I.R.C. §§ l(e), 641(b), 651(a), 661(a) (2002) (trust treated as separate taxpayer
with tax base equal to trust net income less distribution deduction).
151. Joseph M. Dodge, Simplifying Models for the Income Taxation of Trusts and Es-
tates, 14 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 127, 150-56 (1997).
152. This principle would combine the rules of §§ 673, 675, 676, and 677(a). A power to
obtain the corpus indirectly by non-arm's-length dealings would be considered an indirect
possibility. Another indirect possibility is for income or corpus to be paid to legal depen-
dents. Section 677(b), which requires payments to actually discharge a support obligation,
should not survive reform.
153. Section 674 provides three tiers of rules, depending on the identity of the trustee,
for dealing with the issue of when trustee powers cause the trust to be a grantor trust.
154. In the paradigm situation, where an investment is purchased, the cost of an invest-
ment (acquired with dollars, such as salary, previously subject to tax) is a non-deductible
capital expenditure.
155. See Consumption Tax, supra note 7, at 592.
[Vol. 56
COMPARING A REFORMED ESTATE TAX
tion-value basis in the trust assets for income tax purposes. Third, follow-
ing inception the system would (perhaps with some modifications)
operate along the lines of current Subchapter J, under which distributed
current income is taxed to the distributees, nondistributed current income
is taxed to the trust, and non-income distributions are tax-free to distribu-
tees. This system would avoid the indefinite deferral of tax on corpus.
E. POWERS OF APPOINTMENT
Under the estate and gift tax, the possession of a general power of ap-
pointment is treated as ownership for estate and gift tax purposes, so that
the lapse (at death or otherwise), exercise, or release of such power is
treated as a transfer for estate and/or gift tax purposes.156 The term "gen-
eral power of appointment" is a power to obtain the property (free of any
trust) or vest it in oneself, one's estate, or the creditors of either, but
there are exceptions for powers subject to certain ascertainable standards
or which are jointly held with adverse parties (or the creator of the
power).' 57 There appears to be no compelling reason to substantially al-
ter this scheme in the context of an estate or inheritance tax.
Prior accessions tax proposals would have treated the acquisition of a
general power of appointment (however defined) as an immediate acces-
sion of the underlying property under a constructive ownership theory.'5 8
This approach, however, is inconsistent with the principle that the acqui-
sition of a trust interest is not itself an accession. Certainly, a general
testamentary power is hard to distinguish from a remainder interest.
There are additional reasons for not following the traditional approach.
First, although the concept of a general power of appointment is useful
(and perhaps necessary) under the current federal transfer taxes as a
means to identify transferors, under an accessions tax such a purpose is
irrelevant. Second, a general power of appointment could be used to ac-
celerate accessions tax (that is, to negate deferral), if the holder of the
power also held one or more beneficial interests in the trust. Third (and
outside of the anti-deferral context), if the acquisition of a general power
of appointment were treated as an accession with no compensating tax
benefit (as typically occurs under the current transfer taxes), 159 then no-
body would create such a power (or, stated differently, the general power
of appointment concept would become a trap for the unwary). Fourth,
transfer tax law would be simplified if the concept were rendered irrele-
vant. Thus, the accessions tax should attribute no significance to the pos-
session, expiration, lapse, or release of a general power. If the exercise of
156. See I.R.C. §§ 2041(a)(2), 2514(b) (2002).
157. See I.R.C. §§ 2041(b)(1), 2514(c) (2002).
158. See Andrews, supra note 11, at 595; Halbach, supra note 11, at 237.
159. Compensating tax benefits include qualification for the marital deduction, qualifi-
cation for gift tax annual exclusions, and avoiding the GST. Under an accessions tax, treat-
ing the acquisition of a general power of appointment as an accession would not prevent
trust distributions to other persons from being treated as taxable accessions.
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a power causes a distribution, the accession attributable to the distribu-
tion would be charged to the recipient.
Under the current income tax, the possession (by a person alone) of an
unrestricted power to currently obtain the income and/or corpus of a trust
causes the current income to be taxed to the holder of the power under
§ 678. Under an income-inclusion system that follows Subchapter J in
part, § 678 could be used to facilitate tax avoidance, because a low-
bracket person could be given an inter vivos general power of appoint-
ment so as to "attract" income to such person rather than the trust or the
actual distributees. Accordingly, § 678 should be repealed.
F. LIFE INSURANCE
Under an estate or inheritance tax, there are various possible bases for
taxing life insurance proceeds to the insured's estate: (1) the insured's
involvement in "taking out" the policy, (2) the insured's payment of pre-
miums, and (3) the insured's rights in, and powers over, the policy at
death. The first two have been tried and abandoned due to the difficulty
of ascertaining the facts and sorting out their significance, 60 leaving the
third as the current basis of taxation, but the third is not without
problems of its own. 161 If the third approach is retained, the statute
should be clarified. Another possibility is to move to a rule that life in-
surance proceeds are per se included in the gross estate of the insured,
which would be based on the theory that the death of the insured brings
the proceeds into being and that in virtually all cases the insured was
involved in procuring, maintaining, and/or controlling the policy and its
disposition.
The problem of connecting the proceeds to the insured or to premiums
vanishes under a transferee-based tax. The receipt of life insurance pro-
ceeds by a non-owner of the policy would be gross income under an in-
come tax and an accession under an accessions tax.
An issue would be whether the receipt of proceeds is an accession
under the accessions tax where the beneficiary is also the owner of the
policy. 162 In theory, the resolution of this issue would depend on how the
160. For example, the significance of premium payments clearly differs between pure
term insurance and ordinary life insurance, and in the latter case all premium dollars
should not be weighted the same. See Substantial Ownership, supra note 102, at 702-12;
Douglas A. Kahn & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Tax Consequences of Assigning Life Insur-
ance-Time for Another Look, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 381 (1999).
161. Under § 2042, the proceeds are included in an insured's estate by reason of the
possession by the insured at death (or within 3 years of death) of "incidents of ownership"
over the policy (or the proceeds being payable to the insured's estate). As a result of the
Second Circuit's decision in Estate of Skifter v. Comm'r, 468 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1972), the
Service issued Rev. Rul. 84-179, 1984-2 C.B. 195, holding that the term "incidents of own-
ership" possesses a different meaning according to whether the insured retained them or
acquired them by other means. In my opinion, this distinction has no basis in the text of§ 2042, the regulations, the legislative history, or relevant case law.
162. The accessions tax proposals virtually ignore the life insurance issue, and simply
assume that the estate and gift tax approach would carry over. See Andrews, supra note
11, at 591; Halbach, supra note 11, at 294.
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person acquired the policy. If the uninsured person acquired the policy
by gift or bequest, the transaction would be viewed as the equivalent of
the gratuitous acquisition of a remainder interest, which would be a non-
taxable event, and the receipt of the proceeds would be a taxable acces-
sion. If the policy were purchased, then receipt of the proceeds would
not be an accession. However, a rule distinguishing gifts from purchases
would create an open invitation to avoid accessions tax by the insured
selling the policy to a relative. 163 The only way that such a device can be
realistically avoided 164 is to treat all life insurance proceeds received (di-
rectly or indirectly) by a person outside of a commercial context as being
taxable, with a consideration offset equal to amounts paid to acquire or
maintain the policy.
Under an income-inclusion system there would be little harm in follow-
ing the purchase-gift distinction, since in both cases the proceeds would
be includable by the recipient subject to appropriate basis offset.
G. VALUATION
Under any form of wealth transfer tax, there are two basic conceptual
issues pertaining to valuation. One is whether property should be valued
as if it were changing hands in an arm's length market transaction or in-
stead should be valued taking into account the facts surrounding the
transfer (such as family relationships). The present estate and gift tax has
taken the first approach, which is known as the willing-buyer-willing-
seller test.165 The second issue relates to situations where the transfer (or
death causing the transfer) itself may affect the value of the property.
Here, four possible valuation principles present themselves: (1) the value
of what the transferor had just prior to the moment of death, (2) the
value of what the transferees severally receive, (3) the greater of the two,
or (4) the lesser of the two. Judicial and administrative output appears to
have evolved towards the lesser-of-the two approach, although this can
hardly be said to be a clear rule. 166 Indeed, confusion is understandable
if the current command to value assets "at death" is taken seriously,
since, if there is such an "instant," it has no "duration."'167 An asset can
be meaningfully valued at the moment just prior to death (ignoring the
163. The problem here is basically the same as that of selling a trust interest to a rela-
tive. See supra note 146 and accompanying text..
164. The purchase-gift distinction is hard to sort out in practice, since the insured may
give or lend cash to the related-party purchaser "under the table," or pay premiums after
the putative purchase.
165. Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2031-1(b), 25.2512-1.
166. Compare Goodman v. Granger, 243 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
264 (1957), and Estate of Harrison v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-8 (looking to what
legatee received), with Ahmanson Found. v. United States, 674 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981)
(looking to what decedent had).
167. The lesser-of-the-two approach might be based on the supposition that the estate
tax is imposed on the value of property as it passes from a decedent to a legatee, as
§ 2031(a) requires valuation "at the time of death." See Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States,
279 U.S. 151, 155 (1929) (holding that valuation must be made without regard to facts
occurring after death). Arguably, the so-called loss-of-key-man discount, see Moskowitz v.
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fact of actual death) or just after death (taking death into account, if not
events subsequent to death), but the concept of a value "at" death has no
"real world" meaning.
1. Valuation Under a Transferor-Oriented Tax
It is arguable that the present estate and gift tax has resolved these
issues in precisely the wrong way. Thus, the value of property in a partic-
ular person's estate should depend on the facts and circumstances sur-
rounding the actual transfer, not some analytical construct possibly
divorced from reality. Nevertheless, only objective facts and circum-
stances should be considered.
Moreover, a transferor-oriented tax should be based on what the trans-
feror had, not what the various transferees receive individually.168 Plain
meaning interpretation of the statutory statement that the tax is on the
estate "of the decedent" (not the decedent's successors) should have
guided interpretation in the direction of the "value of what the transferor
had" principle. 169 However, the present estate and gift tax has instead
looked to the value of what the transferees severally obtain on the theory
that "valuation inherently looks to the future.' 170 This statement is true
in the sense that the value of an asset is largely a function of discounting
future returns to the present. However, the statement ignores the issue
of what assets are to be so valued, and under a transferor-oriented tax, it
is the assets owned by the transferor, not the assets received individually
by transferees. Thus, the rule should be that assets are to be valued at the
moment just prior to death (or gift) disregarding the actual fact of death
or gift. 171
Even one who disagrees with one or both of the previous points might
feel that there is internal inconsistency within current doctrine. That is, if
a "hypothetical market transaction" test is adopted as a guiding principle
with respect to the underlying property, then the fact of death would
seem to be irrelevant, or vice versa.
Conceptualisms aside, instrumental concerns should also play a role in
valuation doctrine. One problem is that the factual flavor of many valua-
tion cases imposes heavy transaction costs on the parties and the system.
United States, 76-1 USTC T 13,117 (N.D.N.Y. 1975), is illegitimate, since the consequences
of the loss occur after death.
168. This statement has principal relevance to (1) the situation where minority interests
in enterprises are created by the act of transfer and (2) situations where restrictions de-
pressing value appear (or disappear) by reason of the transfer. These situations are dis-
cussed below.
169. Similarly, the statutory command under the gift tax is the "value at the date of
gift," see I.R.C. § 2512(a) (2002), and the gift tax is imposed on the "transfer of property by
gift," see I.R.C. § 2501(a)(1) (2002).
170. United States v. Land, 303 F.2d 170, 173 (5th Cir. 1962).
171. Such a rule would appear to be inconsistent with the § 2033 rule that the value of
present or future interests that terminate at death is zero, but there is really no inconsis-
tency, because in these cases the asset itself is an interest that terminates or lapses at death,
whereas otherwise the assets do survive the transfer.
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Therefore, one should look to the possibility of designing fair or appro-
priate rules of substance and procedure to reduce such costs. Second, a
system that encourages the actual destruction of wealth, or transactions
that appear to destroy wealth (but actually do not), is a bad system. 72
Third, transactions that would be unheard of or rare in the absence of
transfer tax should not be treated as legitimate or having substance.
These principles and concerns can be played out under a transferor-
oriented tax in various ways. Since I have recently offered some sugges-
tions along these lines concerning such familiar issues as enterprise valua-
tion, the blockage rule, lack-of-marketability discounts, and minority-
interest discounts, 173 it would serve little purpose to repeat them here. I
would only add that any restrictions (direct or indirect, such as through
the interposition of an entity) 74 on the liquidation of the enterprise or
the alienation of any interest therein should generally be viewed with sus-
picion, just as are other restrictions on alienation. 75 Since self-imposed
restrictions that depress value are against the economic self-interest of
the transferor and/or her successors, a presumption should arise that they
would not have been imposed except to avoid tax. Therefore, any pre-
sent or future restriction imposed during the transferor's lifetime (or
when owned by a person from whom the asset was obtain by one or more
gratuitous transfers) should be disregarded unless the transferor's repre-
sentative can prove that tax avoidance was not a significant purpose.176
Only legitimate "business" reasons would be allowed as justification for
taking such a restriction into account. 77 A reason relating to "preserving
going concern value" should not be given credence unless going concern
value is demonstrably greater than liquidation value in the absence of the
restrictions. A reason relating to "continuity of family involvement (or
family control)" should not be considered as a business reason at all.
Until the enactment of § 2703 in 1991, the value of an asset could often
be depressed by entering into an enforceable contract that restricted the
alienation of the interest, typically by allowing a (related) person to
purchase the asset for a price below actual fair market value. Section
2703 operates to disregard agreements of this type, but there is an excep-
tion where the agreement is a bona fide business arrangement (and its
terms are comparable to similar agreements entered into at arm's length)
172. Mary Louise Fellows & William H. Painter, Valuing Close Corporations for Federal
Wealth Transfer Taxes: A Statutory Solution to the Disappearing Wealth Syndrome, 30 STAN.
L. REV. 895 (1978).
173. See Deemed Realization, supra note 6, at 488-94.
174. This is a back-handed way of referring to the use of investment holding companies.
175. Section 2704(a) roughly conforms to the idea stated in the text. Under that sec-
tion, the lapse of valuable rights is treated as a gratuitous transfer. The lapse of a valuable
right is equivalent to the imposition of a restriction.
176. Compare § 2704(b), which causes restrictions on liquidation to be disregarded, but
only if (1) they will (or may) drop off at or after the transfer and (2) the restriction is not
imposed by State or Federal law. This last qualification renders § 2704(b) largely
ineffective.




and the agreement is not a device to transfer value to family members for
less than full and adequate consideration in money or money's worth.
But, objectively, any bargain sale to a relative (within the requisite degree
of relationship) operates as a gratuitous transfer to such person, and it is
far easier to accurately value this transfer when the bargain purchase oc-
curs than when the restriction is imposed. Hence, the bona-fide-business-
arrangement concept should never justify a discount keyed to a restric-
tion on alienation when the buyer is a "family member" (however de-
fined) or a natural object of the taxpayer's bounty. Only if there is
conflicting evidence as to the relationship between the parties should the
concept of a bona fide business arrangement possess relevance.
In an entity estate freeze, the owner of a controlling interest in a
closely-held entity carves out a senior equity interest (such as preferred
stock) that "hogs" the value of the enterprise by virtue of carrying a high
fixed rate of return, leaving the junior equity (hopefully with a high ap-
preciation potential) with a zero or low value. The owner then makes a
gift of the low-value junior equity and retains the senior equity (the value
of which is essentially frozen). Present § 2701 "attacks" such a device
mainly by treating the gift of the junior equity as being also a gift of the
retained senior equity. This results in double estate and gift taxation of
the same property (the senior equity). In my view, § 2701 imposes too
harsh a remedy, but at the same time it is too easy to avoid.178 Entity
estate freeze transactions appear to have been uncommon until their tax
avoidance potential was publicized. 79 Entity estate freezes are similar to
gifts (and sales) of remainder interests and should be treated similarly.
That is, the gift of the junior equity should be treated as incomplete until
the death of the donor or such earlier time as the donor or donee (with
attribution rules) ceases to have a significant interest in the enterprise.180
2. Valuation Issues Under an Accessions Tax
Although many of the same valuation issues and possible solutions de-
scribed above would also arise under an accessions tax, there would be
some significant differences attributable to the fact that an accessions tax
is explicitly imposed upon what the transferee receives, not on what (if
anything) the transferor had. The following would all be treated as gratu-
itous accessions without regard to any alleged business purpose: (1) a bar-
gain purchase from a person to whom the transferee is a natural object of
the person's bounty, (2) the lapse of a restriction imposed while a related
party was the owner, and (3) the acquisition of a majority interest by one
or more accessions, or in combination with property already owned by
178. Section 2701 can be avoided by assuring that payments on the senior equity are
(essentially) guaranteed, the theory being that a mandatory pay-out interest (and by sub-
traction the junior equity interest) can be accurately valued.
179. George Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticated Estate Tax
Avoidance, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 161, 195-204 (1977).
180. This was the approach taken by § 2036(c), enacted in 1987, but was repealed in
1991 in conjunction with the enactment of § 2701.
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the transferee. In addition, restrictions imposed by, or with the agree-
ment or connivance of, the transferee or other related party should be
disregarded, unless it can be shown that the restriction would have been
imposed for business (but not family-control) reasons in the absence of
accessions tax. On the other hand, the case for recognizing minority-in-
terest discounts in this context appears somewhat stronger than under an
estate tax, unless a policy decision is explicitly made to impose family
attribution rules.
An accessions tax can more effectively combat entity estate freezes
than an estate tax. Whereas the estate tax can deem the gift of junior
equity to occur no latter than the donor's death, under an accessions tax
the accession can be delayed until the donee disposes of junior equity,
even if such disposition occurs after the donor's death.
3. Valuation Under an Income-Inclusion System
Valuation under an income-inclusion system would operate along the
same lines as under an accessions tax. However, the income tax is more
flexible than an accessions tax insofar as inclusion can be delayed indefi-
nitely in the case of certain hard-to-value or politically-favored in-kind
assets (closely-held business interests and so-called family farms) by
means of giving such assets a zero basis, pending a subsequent recogni-
tion event (sale, exchange, event rendering valuation possible, or termi-
nation of qualification).' 81
III. CONCLUSION: IS THE ACCESSIONS TAX REALLY THE
BEST ALTERNATIVE?
One of the more controversial aspects of this contribution is the argu-
ment that the generation-skipping problem is illusory. Whether or not
this thesis is accepted on the merits, eliminating generation-skipping-tax
features from the federal transfer taxes, an accessions tax, and/or an in-
come-inclusion system greatly simplifies these systems.
The accessions tax and income-inclusion systems are advantaged over
even a reformed and simplified estate and gift tax not only in being easier
to justify in terms of functions and goals but also by being able to operate
ex post, which eliminates certain valuation problems and simplifies quali-
fication rules with respect to marital transfers. Initially it might appear
that the major difference between the two systems has to do with exemp-
tions and rates. However, closer examination of the purposes of an ac-
cessions tax, in combination with the point that any of these systems
should possess a basically unlimited exclusion for consumption-type inter
vivos gifts (and perhaps bequests), undermines the assumption that life-
time exemptions are a necessary feature of an accessions tax or that ex-
181. For a discussion of possible eligibility rules, see Deemed Realization, supra note 6,




emptions and rates should be keyed to prior accessions rather than other
annualized income. At the same time, although an unlimited marital ex-
clusion is easy enough to justify under the income-inclusion approach, it
would be fundamentally incompatible with an accessions tax approach.
Although tax-free wealth splitting between spouses would be allowed
under an accessions tax, such a system would entail complications and
administrative problems that would be absent from an income-inclusion
approach. Finally, an income-inclusion approach would treat transfers to
a trust as an accession by the trust itself (which would operate thereafter
according to the Subchapter J rules), whereas under an accessions tax the
taxable event, could be indefinitely delayed until distribution, unless a
withholding-credit system is interposed.
In sum, the income-inclusion approach appears to be the simplest pos-
sible system and, with an unlimited marital exclusion and integration with
Subchapter J, the system that would seem most familiar and comfortable
to laypersons and tax experts alike as a substitute for the federal transfer
taxes. In any case, the accessions tax and income-inclusion system, both
being keyed to gratuitous receipts, would be operationally so similar that
it would be tempting (and easy) to combine the two, or to use one to
supplement the other.
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